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THE RISE OF AMERICAN 
CONSERVATISM IN ISRAEL 
Rafi Reznik* 
ABSTRACT 
The American fascination with the link between interpretive methodology and political ideology 
rarely reaches beyond its borders. This Article offers a comparative case study, which converses 
with the American example—Israel. A twofold argument is offered to facilitate this conversation. 
First, the Article identifies a shift in the ideological climate of the Supreme Court of Israel,  
manifested in the rise of a new interpretive method. For the first time, the interpretive theory 
prevailing in Israel, Purposive Interpretation, faces a viable competitor. The Article unpacks the 
challenges posed by the new theory, termed Purposive Originalism, in methodology as well as 
underlying understanding of democratic principles. While Purposive Interpretation is conceptually 
and historically tied to American liberal theories, Purposive Originalism deeply resonates 
American conservatism, espousing variations on its three basic tenets: originalism, bright-line 
rules, and deference. Second, the Article contends that this development should be understood as 
part of a broader ideological reorientation of the political right-wing in Israel, toward American 
conservatism. Increasingly drawing on the philosophies and strategies of its American counterpart, 
the Israeli Right has adopted the compound of social traditionalism, neo-liberal economic policy, 
and hawkish national security stance, as well as discontent with the administrative state, 
synthesized under the headline of conservatism. An interpretive methodology that strives for the 
same values enshrined in this political project fulfills a vital role in its success. Such a convergence 
of judicial and political reinterpretations of conservatism marks an Israeli recreation of the 
dynamics that emerged in the U.S. in the 1980s, with an all-encompassing conservative backlash 
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against legal liberalism. The Israeli case thus reveals how American conservatism can be, and is 
indeed, incorporated into different cultural and constitutional settings. 
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I.      INTRODUCTION 
Two overarching phenomena permeate high-stakes 
constitutional adjudication in the United States: one is the formation 
of two opposing ideological camps; the other is a fierce debate over 
interpretive methodology. The existence of both phenomena is widely 
recognized yet the nature of their relationship remains contested. The 
late Justice Scalia, for example, took pride in his adherence to a 
particular interpretive method, on the one hand; and willingly 
identified as a conservative, on the other hand—yet denied any 
connection between the two.1 Judges who are widely considered liberal 
tend to favor distinctly different interpretive methods, but similarly 
resist attaching to them any particular ideological label.2 While it seems 
to have escaped the bench, observers of the judiciary have nonetheless 
recognized that there are quite overwhelming overlaps between 
“conservative” judges and “originalist”/“textualist” ones, and between 
“liberal” judges and “living constitutionalist”/“purposivist” ones.3 
                                               
 1 Margaret H. Lemos, The Politics of Statutory Interpretation, 89 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 849, 851 (2013) (reviewing ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, 
READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012)). On Scalia’s self-
identification as a “social conservative,” see Ian Samuel, The Counter-Clerks of Justice 
Scalia, 10 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 1, 2 (2016). 
 2 See STEPHEN BREYER, THE COURT AND THE WORLD: AMERICAN LAW 
AND THE NEW GLOBAL REALITIES 277–78 (2016) (arguing that while being 
“inevitably the lawyer I am” influences his interpretation, personal views are still “a 
different concept” from either politics or ideology); Ruth Bader Ginsburg on Becoming 
‘Notorious,’ NEWSHOUR, Oct. 10, 2016, available at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YSEWCA2Hhmo (upon being described as a 
liberal, Justice Ginsburg responded: “The label ‘liberal’ or ‘conservative’ [ . . . ] What 
do those labels mean? It depends on whose ox is being gored;’” see also infra notes 
125–126 and accompanying text (on liberalism and conservatism as contested 
concepts)). 
 3 The most famous exception is probably Justice Kennedy: a conservative 
who employed evolutionary interpretivism. This was most notable in the LGBT 
rights decisions he authored for the Court—Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2071 
(2015); U.S. v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 
(2003)—yet apparent already at his nomination hearing. Morton J. Horwitz, The Bork 
Nomination and American Constitutional History, 39 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1029, 1037–39 
(1988). 
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Notwithstanding its American idiosyncrasies, such an 
interpretation-ideology nexus can also manifest elsewhere. This Article 
offers a novel comparative case study: Israel. 
For decades, Israeli judges have been employing one 
interpretive method only, called Purposive Interpretation (“PI”), 
which pertains to all legal materials. By U.S. standards, PI is a liberal 
theory of interpretation. This Article argues that there is a new method 
on the rise in the Israeli Supreme Court, hereby termed Purposive 
Originalism (“PO”). It is further argued that this interpretive 
development also signifies a shift in the Court’s political climate, calling 
to mind its American counterpart. For it is not only a conservative 
method, but more specifically, one that deeply resonates American 
conservatism.4 Moreover, the backlash against legal liberalism in Israel is 
not confined to the judiciary, but is rather heralded by the political 
sphere, where a project of assimilating American conservatism has 
been underway for a longer period of time. Viewed under this light, it 
becomes clear that the current historical moment in Israel resembles 
in important respects the 1980s in the United States. 
By comparing these two moments of convergence between 
political and interpretive formulations of conservatism—the American 
and the Israeli—this Article aims to make a threefold contribution to 
comparative law literature. 
First, the Israeli Supreme Court is in a stage of transition, 
which may have significant and long-lasting ramifications for Israeli 
law. The Article develops a framework toward understating this 
doctrinal development in interpretive methodology as fulfilling a vital 
role in the evolution of conservative ideology. The American 
experience provides a useful vocabulary, although by no means 
sufficient, for processing this potential paradigmatic shift and 
constructing a discourse around it. Specifically, it sheds light on a 
crucial yet neglected element of American-Israeli relations: how the 
inspiration Israeli law draws from the U.S., and the inspiration Israeli 
                                               
 4 The framework of American conservatism is explicated at infra section 
III.A. 
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politics draw from the U.S.—two phenomena that have been studied 
separately—are related. 
Second, at a time when American scholarship is recognizing 
that not as much hinges on interpretive methodology as is often 
assumed,5 in Israel the recognition that the outcomes of highly 
contentious cases can and do hinge on the method by which meaning 
is extracted from text, is only now beginning to take shape. This 
moment of jurisprudential castling between the two systems may 
broaden the interpretive vocabularies of both and enrich their 
interpretive discourses. 
Finally, from a broader comparative perspective, this Article 
promotes a deeper appreciation of how interpretive methods function 
within broader political projects. The Israeli example enriches and 
challenges recent studies on non-American originalism,6 by presenting 
a case that expressly echoes the historical American experience. 
Despite cultural and historical differences, Israeli originalism assumes 
similar political colors as American originalism, and is similarly 
accompanied by a blooming conservative power outside of the judicial 
sphere. The Article thus joins the growing recognition that 
comparative inquiries cannot be divorced from cultural-genealogical 
processes.7 At the same time, it suggests that it is precisely a 
comparative investigation that can best elucidate the essential 
components of a legal phenomenon, including in its original 
manifestation. Case in point: conservative interpretation. 
The argument is divided into two parts, as follows. Part II 
focuses on the interpretive debate unfolding in the Supreme Court of 
Israel. It opens with a description of the prevailing theory of 
interpretation in the Israeli judiciary, Purposive Interpretation, and 
                                               
 5 Adam M. Samaha, Low Stakes and Constitutional Interpretation, 13 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 305 (2010). 
 6 See Jorge M. Farinacci Fernós, Originalism in Puerto Rico: Original Explication 
and Its Relation with Clear Text, Broad Purpose and Progressive Policy, 85 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 
203 (2016); Kerri A. Froc, Is Originalism Bad for Women? The Curious Case of Canada’s 
“Equal Rights Amendment,” 19 REV. CONST. STUD. 237 (2015); Yvonne Tew, 
Originalism at Home and Abroad, 52 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 780 (2014). 
 7 See, e.g., Pierre Legrand, Negative Comparative Law, 10(2) J. COMP. L. 405 
(2015). 
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explains its connection to American legal liberalism (section II.A.). It 
is then argued that PI is currently being challenged by a new method, 
Purposive Originalism. Section II.B. delineates the details of PO and 
explains how they counter legal liberalism. Part III situates this 
development in the realm of American conservatism and its 
Israelization. First, it explores American conservatism as a 
comprehensive political agenda (section III.A.1.). Next, it shifts to 
conservative adjudication as an enterprise that strives to realize the 
same values, both instrumentally and intrinsically, via interpretive 
methods (section III.A.2.). Finally, the Article brings these discussions 
together. Section III.B. is the heart of this Article. It argues that PO is 
not only a conservative method of interpretation, but a component in 
an emerging movement of American conservatism assimilated into the 
Israeli context. This assimilation is apparent in the ideologies and 
strategies espoused by political, judicial, and civil society forces. These 
forces are linked together ex ante, in the process of selecting the judges 
to join the bench, and ex post, in the adjudicative potential to further 
the goals of conservative policymaking. The discussion proceeds in the 
following order: interpretive methodology (section III.B.1.); judicial 
appointments (section III.B.2.); the political sphere (section III.B.3.); 
judicial outcomes (section III.B.4.). 
II. THE RISE OF PURPOSIVE ORIGINALISM IN ISRAEL 
As far as countries halfway around the world go, the United 
States and Israel have a very close relationship, ranging across various 
public spheres—politics, civil society, intellectual life. The legal sphere 
is no exception, and the jurisprudence of the United States Supreme 
Court has extensively influenced its Israeli counterpart, particularly in 
constitutional contexts.8 However, the American debate surrounding 
                                               
 8 See Hadar Aviram, Bad Role Models? American Influence on Israeli Criminal Justice 
Policy, J. INT’L & COMP. L. (forthcoming), available at 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3404281; MENACHEM MAUTNER, LIBERALISM IN 
ISRAEL: ITS HISTORY, PROBLEMS, AND FUTURES 380 (2019) [HEBREW]; SUZIE 
NAVOT, THE CONSTITUTION OF ISRAEL: A CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS 243 (2014) 
[hereinafter NAVOT 2014]; Tamar Hostovsky Brandes, Human Dignity as a Central 
Pillar in Constitutional Rights Jurisprudence in Israel: Definitions and Parameters, in ISRAELI 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE MAKING 267, 275 (Gideon Sapir, Daphne Barak-
Erez & Aharon Barak eds., 2013); Yoram Rabin & Arnon Gutfeld, Marbury v. 
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interpretive methodology has been absent from the Israeli judicial 
climate. Grounded in the exceptional, perhaps sacred or fetishistic 
status of the U.S. Constitution in American public discourse, the 
originalist/living constitution debate is unique.9 Generally, judicial 
disagreements in other common law jurisdiction do not revolve around 
interpretive methodology, and even when interpretive debates ensue, 
with varying degrees of U.S. influence, they do not take center stage as 
polarizing issues.10 Accordingly, for decades Israeli judges have been 
using one method only for interpreting constitutional and statutory 
texts.11 
                                               
Madison and Its Impact on Israeli Constitutional Law, 15 U. MIAMI INT’L & COMP. L. 
REV. 303 (2007); Pnina Lahav, American Influence on Israel’s Jurisprudence of Free Speech, 
9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 21 (1981). The relationship is not reciprocal, though; on 
the reluctance of U.S. courts to turn to foreign law, see BREYER, supra note 2. 
 9 RAN HIRSCHL, COMPARATIVE MATTERS: THE RENAISSANCE OF 
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 147 (2014); Jamal Greene, On the Origins of 
Originalism, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2009); AHARON BARAK, THE JUDGE IN A 
DEMOCRACY 133–35 (2006). 
 10 Kim Lane Scheppele, Jack Balkin is an American, 25 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 
23 (2013); Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Constitutional Interpretation, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 689 (Michel Rosenfeld & 
András Sajó eds., 2012). For similar discussions in other jurisdictions, see Noam 
Kolt, Cosmopolitan Originalism: Revisiting the Role of International Law in Constitutional 
Interpretation, 41 MELBOURNE U. L. REV. 182 (2017); Lael K. Weis, What 
Comparativism Tells Us about Originalism, 11 INT’L J. CONST. L. 842 (2013) (Australia); 
Leonid Sirota & Benjamin Oliphant, Originalist Reasoning in Canadian Constitutional 
Jurisprudence, 50 U.B.C. L. REV. 505 (2017); Noura Karazivan, Constitutional Structure 
and Original Intent: Canadian Perspective, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 629 (Canada); E. Kofi 
Abotsi, Purposive Originalism in the Supreme Court: Interpretive Methodology and Problems of 
Certainty, 26 U. GHANA L.J. 173 (2013) (Ghana); Yvonne Tew, Comparative Originalism 
in Constitutional Interpretation in Asia, 29 SING. ACAD. L.J. 719 (2017) (Hong Kong, 
India, Malaysia, Singapore); Stephen Brittain, The Case for an Originalist Approach to 
Constitutional Interpretation in Ireland, 13 TRINITY C.L. REV. 71 (2010) (Ireland); Fernós, 
supra note 6 (Puerto Rico); Gretchen Carpenter, Constitutional Interpretation by the 
Existing Judiciary in South Africa: Can New Wine be Successfully Decanted into Old Bottles?, 
28 COMP. & INT’L L.J. S. AFR. 322 (1995) (South Africa); Ozan O. Varol, The Origins 
and Limits of Originalism: A Comparative Study, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1239 (2011) 
(Turkey). 
 11 Certain judges may have taken liberties in the application of PI, but none 
have overtly challenged it in public law contexts. Contracts are the major site of 
interpretive contestation in Israel, with a school favoring a textual over a purposive 
approach. See DANIEL FRIEDMANN, THE PURSE AND THE SWORD: THE TRIALS OF 
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The lack of an interpretive debate makes sense in the Israeli 
context due to its constitutional history and culture.12 In a nutshell, 
Israel has no full-fledged constitution, owing to the inability to reach 
wide political consensus at the state’s founding in 1948.13 Instead, it 
has ‘Basic Laws’ that were enacted sporadically by the Knesset (Israeli 
parliament), on a ‘chapter-by-chapter’ basis. Absent any special 
constitutional codification, these laws were not traditionally considered 
as equivalent of a formal constitution.14 Fourteen Basic Laws have 
been enacted to date, the majority of which design the operation of 
government institutions. Two of the Basic Laws, both enacted in 1992, 
protect human rights and hence constitute Israel’s ‘Bill of Rights:’ Basic 
Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, and Basic Law: Freedom of 
Occupation. Both include a similar ‘limitation clause’ that renders a 
regular law invalid if it violates enumerated rights, except when 
“befitting the values of the State of Israel, enacted for a proper 
purpose, and to an extent no greater than is required.”15 However, 
                                               
ISRAEL’S LEGAL REVOLUTION 186–88 (Haim Watzman trans., 2016). Still, ultimately 
some model of PI is applied to contracts as well. Jonathan Yovel & Ido Shacham, 
Israeli Contract Law: An Overview, in THE INTERNATIONAL CONTRACT MANUAL 
(2014), available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=1139775, at 10; SHIMON SHETREET & 
WALTER HOMOLKA, JEWISH AND ISRAELI LAW – AN INTRODUCTION 534 (2017). 
 12 Some Israeli scholars deny any room for comparison between the 
American interpretive debate and Israeli law. Gideon Sapir, Living Originalism—The 
Jewish Version, 7 JRSLM. REV. LEGAL STUD. 49, 51 (2013); Iddo Porat, The Use of Foreign 
Law in Israeli Constitutional Adjudication, in ISRAELI CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE 
MAKING, supra note 8, at 151, 158. For a different view, according to which some 
aspects of Israeli jurisprudence make for a paradigmatic case of originalism, see 
Hassan Jabareen, The Paradigm of Originalism: Israeli Constitutional Law and Legal Thought, 
52 ISR. L. REV. 427 (2019) (reviewing ISRAELI CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE 
MAKING, supra note 8). 
 13 See HANNA LERNER, MAKING CONSTITUTIONS IN DEEPLY DIVIDED 
SOCIETIES 53–75 (2011). 
 14 Menachem Mautner, Protection of Liberal Rights Amidst a “War of Cultures” 
(Kulturkampf) between Secular and Religious Groups, 48 ISR. Y.B. HUM. RTS. 125, 130–40 
(2018); LERNER, supra note 13, at 75–82; GIDEON SAPIR, THE ISRAELI 
CONSTITUTION: FROM EVOLUTION TO REVOLUTION 18–29 (2018); NAVOT 2014, 
supra note 8, at 31. 
 15 Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, § 8, English translation available 
at https://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic3_eng.htm; Basic Law: 
Freedom of Occupation, § 4, English translation available at 
https://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic4_eng.htm. See NAVOT 2014, 
supra note 8, at 25–46. 
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neither these nor any other Basic Law explicitly authorize judicial 
invalidation of contradictory statutes. In a landmark decision from 
1995,16 the Supreme Court asserted the authority to strike down 
statutes that unlawfully infringe on constitutional rights, and the Basic 
Laws were thus recognized as having superior normative status. This 
only pertains to statutes enacted after the human rights Basic Laws, 
since in addition to the limitation clauses they also contain ‘savings 
clauses,’ protecting the validity of statutes already on the books. The 
Court has nonetheless ruled that all statutes, new or old, shall be 
interpreted in the light of the Basic Laws, so as to accommodate rather 
than conflict with them as far as the statutory language allows.17 The 
enactment of the human rights Basic Laws, along with the Court’s 
declaration that they enjoy constitutional normative status and 
empower it to conduct judicial review of regular statutes, is termed 
‘The Constitutional Revolution.’18 
                                               




 17 The savings clause included in the Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty 
(§ 10) is absolute, while the one in the Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation (§ 10) was 
limited in time and expired in 2002, stating that until that point conflicting provisions 
shall be interpreted “in the spirit” of the Basic Law. See Rivka Weill, Bills of Rights with 
Strings Attached: Protecting Death Penalty, Slavery, Discriminatory Religious Practices and the 
Past from Judicial Review, in CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUE: RIGHTS, DEMOCRACY 
INSTITUTIONS 308 (Rosalind Dixon et al. eds., 2018). In 2017, Justice Anat Baron 
insinuated, in a concurring opinion denying the recognition of same-sex marriages 
performed in Israel (as any other form of civil marriage), that there may come a day 
when the normative force of the savings clause in the Basic Law: Human Dignity 
and Liberty “will not suffice to block constitutional processes.” HCJ 7339/15 
Aguda—Israel’s LGBT Task Force v. Ministry of Interior (Aug. 31, 2017), ¶ 3 
(Baron, J., concurring), available at 
https://supremedecisions.court.gov.il/Home/Download?path=HebrewVerdicts\1
5\390\073\t06&fileName=15073390.t06&type=4. For criticism of this opinion, see 
SAPIR, supra note 14, at 69–70. 
 18 The term was coined by then-President of the Court, Aharon Barak, in 
reference to the enactment of the human rights Basic Laws, in United Mizrahi Bank, 
supra note 16. It is now commonly used to address the judicial decision as well, or to 
the judicial decision alone. See SAPIR, supra note 14, at 49–58; LERNER, supra note 13, 
at 78–82. 
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The contrast between this constitutional framework and the 
American one is stark. As opposed to the canonical status of the U.S. 
Constitution in the nation’s culture—legal or otherwise—neither the 
Israeli Basic Laws nor the people who enacted them enjoy any such 
public recognition; far from it. In fact, a not uncommon view holds 
that members of Knesset (“MKs”) were “deceived” into voting, 
unaware of its consequences. Some of them would later decry it, 
claiming they had never imagined it would result in a judicial authority 
to strike down statutes, and had they known they would have acted 
differently.19 The ostensible lack of explicit will to enact a formal 
constitution coupled with the recency of the human rights Basic Laws, 
obviate the empirical inclination to search for original intentions, 
understandings, or meanings. It also calls into question the doctrinal 
legitimacy to do so, and generates no such public expectation. 
Accordingly, the interpretive method prevailing in the Israeli judiciary, 
PI, is emphatically purposive.20 
A. Purposive Interpretation 
Neither the Basic Laws nor any other statute detail the method 
by which judges should interpret the law.21 PI was developed by 
                                               
 19 SAPIR, supra note 14, at 38–48. Still, these laws have not been repealed. 
Furthermore, both human rights Basic Laws were amended in 1994 by a large 
majority, and at a time when the argument that they authorize judicial review was 
undoubtedly on the table, and the limitation clauses were left intact. Adam Shinar, 
Accidental Constitutionalism: The Political Foundations and Implications of Constitution-Making 
in Israel, in THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS 207, 214 
n.13 (Denis Galligan & Mila Versteeg eds., 2013); Jabareen, supra note 12, at 444. 
 20 Margit Cohn, Comparative Public Law Research in Israel: A Gaze Westwards, 14 
ASIAN J. COMP. L. S11, S22 (2019) (“Israel’s non-textualist legal tradition has been 
supported by the absence of a full written constitution”). 
 21 A few specific interpretive principles appear in legislation, such as the rule 
of lenity (Penal Law, 5737–1977, § 34U [ כא34 ], English translation available at 
https://www.oecd.org/investment/anti-bribery/anti-
briberyconvention/43289694.pdf) and gender neutrality (Interpretation Law, 5741–
1981, § 6, 35 LSI 370 (1980–81) (Isr.), available at 
https://www.nevo.co.il/law_html/law150/laws%20of%20the%20state%20of%20i
srael-35.pdf). It is also stated that statutory gaps should be filled by appealing to 
precedent, analogy, or “in the light of the principles of freedom, justice, equity and 
peace of Jewish Law and Israel’s heritage” (Foundations of Law, 5740–1980, § 1, 34 
LSI 181 (1979–80) (Isr.), available at 
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Aharon Barak, the most influential jurist in Israeli history.22 
Throughout his tenure as a Supreme Court Justice (1978–2006) and 
President of the Court (equivalent to Chief Justice, 1995–2006), Barak, 
a former law professor, continued to produce a voluminous body of 
scholarship. His main focus in the 1980s–1990s was developing a 
comprehensive theory of judicial interpretation, simultaneously 
implemented in the Court’s jurisprudence.23 PI encompasses all legal 
texts, and it has been adopted by the Israeli judiciary completely, such 
that it is the only method Israeli judges apply when interpreting 
constitutional and statutory texts.24 
The starting point of PI is that the language of the text sets the 
boundaries of its interpretation, and a judge cannot give the words a 
meaning they cannot bear.25 This is a feature of virtually any theory of 
judicial interpretation, and PI belongs in the group of theories 
                                               
https://www.nevo.co.il/law_html/law150/laws%20of%20the%20state%20of%20i
srael-34.pdf (the term “Jewish Law” was added in a 2018 amendment. See Aviram, 
supra note 8, 6 n.34). See generally SHETREET & HOMOLKA, supra note 11, at 49–50; 
NAVOT 2014, supra note 8, at 58–63. 
 22 See, e.g., Tom Ginsburg, You Shall Appoint for Yourself Judges, JEWISH REV. 
BOOKS (Summer 2018), https://jewishreviewofbooks.com/articles/3230/you-
shall-appoint-for-yourself-judges (reviewing FRIEDMANN, supra note 11) (“Towering 
over Israeli law of the past several decades is the singular figure of Aharon Barak”); 
FRIEDMANN, supra note 11, at 198 (“Barak became something of a super-chief justice, 
with power far greater than that wielded by any of his predecessors”). 
 23 For a critique of the way Barak single-handedly reshaped the Israeli legal 
canon by “self-canonization,” see Roei Amit, Position(ing) of a Canon, 21 TEL AVIV U. 
L. REV. [IYUNEI MISHPAT] 81, 89 (1998) [Hebrew]. 
 24 Nir Kedar, Interpretive Revolution: The Rise of Purposive Interpretation in Israeli 
Law, 26 TEL AVIV U. L. REV. [IYUNEI MISHPAT] 737, 737–39 (2003) [Hebrew]; Rafi 
Reznik, Toward an Interpretive Debate in Israel, 12 HEBREW U. L. REV. ONLINE 
[MISHPATIM AL ATAR] 67, 67–68 (2018) [Hebrew], 
https://lawjournal.huji.ac.il/sites/default/files/2019-01/mishpatimonline-12-
067.pdf [Hebrew]. Until the 1980s, there was no uniform interpretive method in 
Israel, and judges applied the interpretive framework inherited, like the law itself, 
from the British Mandate: an oscillation between textual and intentional approaches 
supplemented by common law canons. Kedar, supra, at 741; FRIEDMANN, supra note 
11, at 19–21; Gad Barzilai & Ilan Peleg, Engineering the Law and Justice Deconstruction: 
Ideologies of Knowledge in Law and Politics in Israel and Beyond, 4 J. COMP. L. 205, 209–12 
(2009); ELYAKIM RUBINSTEIN, JUDGES OF THE LAND: THE ORIGIN AND 
CHARACTER OF THE ISRAELI SUPREME COURT 192–200 (1980) [Hebrew]. 
 25 AHARON BARAK, PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION IN LAW 102–03 (2005). 
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instructing judges to conduct this examination broadly, as a mere first 
step.26 For it wishes to leave significant room for purposive 
considerations, which consist of three methodological stages: 
subjective purpose, objective purpose, and ultimate purpose. Barak 
stipulates that the unique aspect of his PI is the last one, which “tries 
to synthesize and integrate” the former two,27 rather than categorically 
choosing one over the other, in order to give the text the best possible 
interpretation in light of its purpose. 
Subjective purpose is the subjective intent of the legal text’s 
author, at the time the text was created. It is an empirical, historical 
fact.28 The primary source for determining the subjective purpose is 
internal—the language of the text. From the text, the judge “in a 
reverse process” attempts to identify the author’s will as to the 
purposes they wished to realize at the time.29 Sources accorded equal 
validity but lesser evidential weight are those external to the text: “the 
totality of circumstances related to its creation,”30 primarily legislative 
history. The “golden presumption” is that the subjective purpose arises 
in its entirety from the text’s “ordinary and natural language.”31 
The next, or rather parallel stage is the objective purpose. This is 
the intent of the reasonable author, or at a higher level of abstraction 
“the intent of the system.”32 It is not an empirical matter, but rather “a 
legal construction that reflects the needs of society.”33 The objective 
purpose is not fixed in time, it is in synch with the “fundamental 
values” of the system and hence dynamic and determined at the time 
of interpretation.34 The primary source for determining the objective 
purpose is once again the text in its entirety. Plenty of external sources 
are also pertinent, including nearby texts; case law; comparative law; 
                                               
 26 This is one of several Dworkinian aspects of the theory. See Ronald A. 
Dworkin, “Natural” Law Revisited, 34 U. FL. L. REV. 165, 171 (1982); infra notes 43–
57 and accompanying text. 
 27 BARAK, PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION, supra note 25, at 182. 
 28 Id. at 120. 
 29 Id. at 135. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. at 144. 
 32 Id. at 148. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. at 154. 
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“general social and historical background;” and the fundamental values 
of the system.35 In discerning the objective purpose, the interpreter 
uses what Barak calls “purposive presumptions,” designed to promote 
and integrate these fundamental values. For example, it is presumed 
that an individual objective purpose (the solution in a given statute to 
a specific social problem), does not contradict the general objective 
purpose (advancing democratic-constitutional principles), unless so 
stated in clear, explicit, and unequivocal language.36 
The final stage of PI is determining the ultimate purpose of the 
text. Judges presume that both the subjective and the objective 
purposes are reflected in the text’s language, and seek to reconcile 
them: “they do whatever they can to reduce conflict” and achieve 
synthesis and integration of the author’s will and the system’s will.37 
This means that from all of the optional subjective purposes, the judge 
should choose the ones that accommodate the objective, and vice 
versa, so that conflict is avoided altogether. In cases of unavoidable 
clash, PI offers broad, discretionary guidelines rather than a simple 
formula. They take the form of continuums, along which the 
interpreted text needs to be situated.38 Barak lists the following 
continuums. The legal character of the text: the more public, 
collectively authored the text—from wills through contracts to statutes 
and constitutions39—the more weight is accorded to the objective 
purpose.40 The age of the text: the subjective purpose is weightier when 
the text is recent. The scope of the issue: the objective element 
strengthens when the issue under regulation is more comprehensive. 
The character of the regime: when a transition of fundamental values 
occurs, the objective purpose is given more weight. Specificity: rules 
invite a more subjective consideration than standards. And content-
                                               
 35 Id. at 159–64. 
 36 Id. at 173–81, 256. 
 37 Id. at 183. 
 38 Id. at 182–206. 
 39 Administrative texts are notably absent from Barak’s scheme (similarly to 
Dworkin. See ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW’S ABNEGATION: FROM LAW’S EMPIRE TO 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE (2016)). Such texts are still interpreted using PI, with 
necessary adjustments. Baruch Bracha, Constitutional Upgrading of Human Rights in 
Israel: The Impact on Administrative Law, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 581 (2001). 
 40 BARAK, PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION, supra note 25, at 132–35. 
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specific considerations: for example, in criminal matters more weight 
is assigned to the objective purpose than in civil issues. PI takes all of 
these factors into account and chooses among them via the 
methodological principle of balance, a term frequently used by Barak. 
In balancing the scales, “[p]urposive interpreters look at the life of the 
text from its conception (and eve before that) until the moment of 
interpretation.”41 
PI sees judicial interpretation as a normative, teleological 
process that unapologetically leaves significant room for discretion, 
while insisting on objectivity and rationality. The basic tenets of PI are 
summed up by Barak with the words “language, purpose, discretion.”42 
In American terms, Israeli law employs a pluralistic 
methodology, under a conception of all legal texts (to varying degrees) 
as “living documents.”43 This should be of no surprise. For in both the 
theory’s doctrinal details and in its historical background, the 
intellectual orbit in which PI is situated is that of American legal 
liberalism. Espousing both liberalism and legalism, this intellectual 
movement is characterized by faith in the potential of courts, 
particularly the Supreme Court, to advance social reform and expand 
the scope of civil rights while maintaining judicial integrity.44 Legal 
liberals were students of the movement’s academic precursor, the 
Legal Process school.45 Barak is no exception, having studied under 
Henry Hart and Albert Sacks at Harvard Law School in the 1960s.46 
                                               
 41 Id. at 183. 
 42 Id. at 268. 
 43 See Barak Medina, “Foundational” Originalism? On Jack Balkin’s Living 
Originalism, 7 JRSLM. REV. LEGAL STUD. 1, 15 (2013). For Barak’s explicit rejection 
of American conservative jurisprudence, see BARAK, PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION, 
supra note 25, at 284–85. 
 44 See LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 2, 
42–46 (1996); Horwitz, Bork Nomination, supra note 3. See also Emma Kaufman, The 
New Legal Liberalism, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 187, 195–98 (2019) (book review). 
 45 KALMAN, supra note 44, at 50. 
 46 See Pnina Lahav, American Moment[s]: When, How and Why Did Israeli Law 
Faculties Come to Resemble Elite U.S. Law Schools?, 10 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 653, 657 
(2009); Kedar, supra note 24, at 759. For Barak’s recognition of Legal Process’s 
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The judicial epitome of legal liberalism was the Warren Court,47 
where teleological interpretivism served as a cardinal tool in the 
advancement of a progressive agenda, viewing the Constitution as “not 
static [ . . . it] must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of 
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”48 Sympathetic 
to the political orientation of the Warren Court yet concerned with the 
absence of objective adjudicatory standards, Legal Process elevated the 
role of procedural and institutional rationality.49 It thus hoped to 
reconcile the realist insight that law, including when made by courts, is 
a tool for the promotion of good social policy, with the subsequent 
concern for democratic legitimacy captured by the counter-
majoritarian difficulty. Legal Process aspired to separate law from 
politics by emphasizing the rational social purpose that each legal text 
pursues, to be discerned by the democratic institution that enjoys 
proper competence, reason, and expertise. Legal Process thus enabled 
legal liberalism to also be liberal legalism, viz. an ontological and 
normative insistence on objective legal categories, whose moral 
orientation is grounded in the integrity of the democratic process. 
Building on the Legal Process theories while shifting the 
intellectual focus to judicial interpretation, legal liberals such as Ronald 
Dworkin, Owen Fiss, and Bruce Ackerman positioned courts at the 
forefront of the protection of rights. The democratic legitimacy of this 
position is derived from the courts’ ability to generate legal doctrines 
                                               
influence on his interpretive approach, see BARAK, PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION, 
supra note 25, at 227–28. 
 47 1953–1969. There is scholarly debate over whether the Burger Court 
(1969–1986) should be considered liberal (see, e.g., KALMAN, supra note 44, at 57), 
conservative (see, e.g., MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & LINDA GREENHOUSE, THE BURGER 
COURT AND THE RISE OF THE JUDICIAL RIGHT (2017)), or as a transitional phase 
from the former to the latter (see, e.g., HERMAN SCHWARTZ, RIGHT WING JUSTICE: 
THE CONSERVATIVE CAMPAIGN TO TAKE OVER THE COURTS 42–47 (2004)). 
 48 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (Warren, C. J.) (referring to the 
Eighth Amendment). 
 49 For an overview of Legal Process, see KALMAN, supra note 44, at 19–47; 
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Making of the Legal Process, 107 HARV. 
L. REV. 2031 (1994). For core Legal Process texts, see HENRY M. HART, JR. & 
ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND 
APPLICATION OF LAW (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, eds., 1994); LON 
L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1964). 
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out of the best possible interpretation of the Constitution, which is the 
ultimate expression of collective morality. In lieu of Legal Process’s 
“morality of function,”50 legal liberalism argues that the Constitution 
demands the interpreter who gives meaning to its words to load them 
with substantive values of political morality. Merging the interpretive 
turn and the historic turn in jurisprudence, legal liberalism engaged in 
a “conversation between generations.”51 
Barak’s PI draws on Legal Process and on legal liberalism, 
holding the courts to be a liberal-democratic institution endowed with 
hermeneutic-teleological expertise.52 To illustrate, per PI, 
“interpretation is not just discovery. It is also creation. The question is 
what creation is best,”53 and “law is a device. It is designed to achieve 
the social aim that lies at the core of the legal system.”54 Barak 
incorporates liberal principles into the definition of democracy,55 and 
believes in judicial ability to give a legal utterance the most charitable 
meaning possible, based on the collective moral vision encapsulated in 
core legal texts.56 The result is judicial legitimacy to uncover the 
fundamental values of the system and to identify the legal rights they 
demand to protect.57 
PI is used in all Israeli courts, and is not a matter of 
controversy, within or outside the judiciary. To be clear, there is in 
Israel a fierce ongoing public debate, and specific criticism of Barak, 
relating to judicial activism and the growing involvement of the Court 
                                               
 50 KALMAN, supra note 44, at 30. 
 51 Id. at 143. 
 52 See also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Nino’s Nightmare: Legal Process Theory as a 
Jurisprudence of Toggling between Facts and Norms, 57 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 865, 905 (2013). 
 53 BARAK, PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION, supra note 25, at 218. 
 54 Id. at 221. 
 55 Kedar, supra note 24, at 760; BARAK, PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION, supra 
note 25, at 235–36; infra note 178. 
 56 BARAK, PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION, supra note 25, at 296. For Barak’s 
divergences from Dworkin, see id. at 296–97, 384–85. 
 57 As summarized by Emma Kaufman, supra note 44, at 198: “the idea that 
constitutional rights trump other rights, and do so because they reflect the most 
valuable public values, is at the heart of legal liberalism.” 
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in political questions since the 1980s.58 But PI is not the target of the 
critics’ arrows, and outside of legal circles the term has very little 
resonance. Instead of contestation over the method by which texts are 
given meaning, the discontent manifests in animosity toward 
discretion-conferring judicial mechanisms implemented by the Barak 
Court, particularly minimal threshold standards for justiciability and 
standing,59 and open-ended standards for administrative and statutory 
review, such as reasonableness and proportionality.60 It would not be 
an overstatement to say that as a strictly interpretive theory, rather than 
a general adjudicative framework, PI has met with more serious 
engagement in U.S. academia than in Israeli legal circles.61 Enter Justice 
Noam Sohlberg. 
                                               
 58 See Mautner, Protection of Liberal Rights, supra note 14, at 143–48; 
FRIEDMANN, supra note 11, at 184 and passim; SAPIR, supra note 14, at 29 and passim. 
It is another question whether the narrative presented by such critics, according to 
which the Israeli Supreme Court is an exceedingly activist one, is accurate. For 
analyses more sympathetic to Barak, see Joseph H. H. Weiler & Doreen Lustig, 
Foreword: A Good Place in the Middle: The Israeli Constitutional Revolution from a Global and 
Comparative Perspective, 38 TEL AVIV U. L. REV. [IYUNEI MISHPAT] 419 (2016) 
[Hebrew]; Yigal Mersel, On Aharon Barak’s Activist Image, 47 TULSA L. REV. 339 
(2011); Barak Medina, Four Myths of Judicial Review: A Response to Richard Posner’s Critique 
of Aharon Barak’s Judicial Activism, 49 HARV. INT’L L.J. ONLINE 1 (2007), 
http://www.harvardilj.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/HILJ-
Online_49_Medina.pdf. 
 59 FRIEDMANN, supra note 11, at 55. 
 60 See Alon Harel, Skeptical Reflections on Justice Aharon Barak’s Optimism, 39 
ISR. L. REV. 261, 263 n.5 (2006) (reviewing BARAK, THE JUDGE, supra note 9). 
 61 For American engagements with Barak, see Frank I. Michelman, Israel’s 
“Constitutional Revolution”: A Thought from Political Liberalism, 19 THEORETICAL INQ. L. 
745 (2018); OWEN FISS, PILLARS OF JUSTICE 175–86 (2017); SCALIA & GARNER, 
supra note 1, at 481 (listing publications by Barak as sources “that we consulted and 
that influenced us”); Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutional Personae, 2013 SUP. CT. REV. 433, 
435 n.10; Sanford Levinson, To What Extent is Judicial Intervention against Torture a 
“Hollow Hope”? Reflections on the Israeli and American Judicial Experiences since 2001, 47 
TULSA L. REV. 363 (2011); KENT GREENAWALT, LEGAL INTERPRETATION: 
PERSPECTIVES FROM OTHER DISCIPLINES AND PRIVATE TEXTS 329–36 (2010); 
Stanley Fish, Intention Is All There Is: A Critical Analysis of Aharon Barak’s Purposive 
Interpretation in Law, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 1109 (2008); Richard A. Posner, Enlightened 
Despot, NEW REPUBLIC (Apr. 23, 2007), 
https://newrepublic.com/article/60919/enlightened-despot (reviewing BARAK, 
THE JUDGE, supra note 9); Robert Bork, Barak’s Rule, 27 AZURE 125 (2007) 
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B. Purposive Originalism 
In a series of dissents and concurrences starting in 2016,62 
Israeli Supreme Court Justice Noam Sohlberg has diverged from PI to 
form a theory of a distinct, coherent internal logic. Although, unlike 
Barak, Sohlberg has yet to offer a comprehensive articulation of his 
theory out of context,63 an inductive analysis reveals there is a 
competing interpretive method in the works. I have detailed the nuts 
and bolts of this inductive process elsewhere;64 here my focus is on the 
political content of the emerging theory, and hence brief descriptions 
of the three main opinions will suffice, followed by an explication of 
the interpretive schema to which they give rise. Thus far, PO has been 
concerned with statutory interpretation. 
In Gini v. The Chief Rabbinate, Justice Sohlberg opined, in 
dissent, that restaurants may not display signs attesting to their keeping 
                                               
(reviewing BARAK, THE JUDGE, supra note 9). For criticism of this orientation, see 
Ginsburg, supra note 22 (“Friedmann pithily captures the sentiment when he asks 
just who Barak’s primary audience was: the Israeli public or a bunch of professors at 
Yale Law School, where Barak teaches each year”). For non-American perspectives 
on Barak, see Daphne Barak-Erez, Judicial Conversations and Comparative Law: The Case 
of Non-Hegemonic Countries, 47 TULSA L. REV. 405 (2011); THE JURISPRUDENCE OF 
AHARON BARAK: VIEWS FROM EUROPE (Maartje de Visser & Willem Witteveen eds., 
2010). 
 62 HCJ 6494/14 Gini v. Chief Rabbinate of Israel (June 6, 2016), available at 
https://supremedecisions.court.gov.il/Home/Download?path=HebrewVerdicts\1
4\940\064\o11&fileName=14064940_o11.txt&type=4 [Hebrew] [hereinafter Gini 
I]. This case was decided by a standard panel of three, and following a decision by 
the President of the Court was reevaluated by an extended panel (including the 
original three judges), in a “further hearing” procedure. HCJFH 5026/16 Gini v. 
Chief Rabbinate of Israel, (Sept. 12, 2017), ¶¶ 18-27 (Naor, President), available at 
http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files/16/260/050/c16/16050260.c16.pdf [Hebrew] 
[hereinafter Gini II]; a brief summary of the case in English is available at Uzi 
Vogelman et al., Israel: The State of Liberal Democracy, in 2017 GLOBAL REVIEW OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 151, 155 (Richard Albert et al. eds., 2018). 
 63 In 2020, Justice Sohlberg took a first step in this direction. Noam 
Sohlberg, On Subjective Values and Objective Judges, 18 HASHILOACH 37 (2020), available 
at https://hashiloach.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/hashiloach-18print.pdf 
[Hebrew]. 
 64 Rafi Reznik, Purposive Originalism: The Rise of American Conservatism 
in Israel (Dec., 2018) (unpublished LL.M. thesis, New York University) (on file with 
author); Reznik, supra note 24. 
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of Kosher standards unless issued by the Chief Rabbinate, a state 
agency that employs rabbis who supervise food establishments.65 The 
statutory provision under interpretation provides that “the owner of a 
food establishment shall not present it in writing as Kosher, unless 
given a Kosher certificate,”66 a document only rabbis of the Chief 
Rabbinate are authorized to provide.67 The majority ruled, in a 5:2 
decision, that as long as said signs do not use the word Kosher they are 
not Kosher certificates, and hence may be displayed even if issued by 
others. For the law does not forbid to truthfully detail the standards of 
food preparation and serving restaurants keep. This interpretation was 
chosen as best realizing the legislative purpose: to prevent consumer 
fraud. Justice Sohlberg, following an extensive foray into legislative 
history, concluded that the legislature intended to create a monopoly 
over “Kosher representations,” aiming to limit the “space for fraud 
and deceit of consumers” by keeping an institutional standard upheld 
exclusively by the Chief Rabbinate.68 Conversely, the objective purpose 
was found to favor the result reached by the majority, which minimizes 
the infringement on the constitutional rights to freedom of occupation 
of restaurant owners, autonomy of consumers, and freedom of religion 
of both groups.69 In this clash between the subjective and objective 
purposes, Sohlberg concluded that the former prevails. The reasoning 
                                               
 65 See generally SUZIE NAVOT, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF ISRAEL 213–
15 (2007) [hereinafter NAVOT 2007]. On Kosher regulation in the U.S., see Shayna 
M. Sigman, Kosher Without Law: The Role of Nonlegal Sanctions in Overcoming Fraud Within 
the Kosher Food Industry, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 509 (2004); Mark A. Berman, Kosher 
Fraud Statutes and the Establishment Clause: Are They Kosher?, 26 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. 
PROBS. 1 (1992). 
 66 Kashrut (Prohibition of Deceit) Law, 5743–1983, § 3(a), 37 LSI 147 (1982–
83) (Isr.), available at 
https://www.nevo.co.il/law_html/law150/laws%20of%20the%20state%20of%20i
srael-37.pdf. 
 67 Id. § 2(a)(1). 
 68 Gini I, supra note 62, ¶¶ 45–48 (Sohlberg, J.). 
 69 Id. ¶¶ 51–52 (Sohlberg, J.). Freedom of occupation enjoys constitutional 
status thanks to its enumeration in the Basic Law: Freedom of Occupation. 
Consumer autonomy and freedom of religion are not explicitly mentioned in the 
Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, but have been derived by the Court from 
the constitutional right to dignity enumerated therein. Hostovsky Brandes, supra note 
8, at 269; NAVOT 2007, supra note 65, at 211–12. 
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offered was that the legislature’s original intent trumps when it is clear, 
and when the infringement on rights is not substantial.70 
The second major exposition of PO was another state and 
religion ‘hot potato,’ Association of Merchants v. The Minister of Interior.71 
Dissenting again, Sohlberg maintained that municipalities lack 
authority to allow supermarkets in certain areas to open for business 
on Saturdays, due to a provision in the statute regulating work hours, 
which reads: “in days of rest [ . . . ] a shop owner shall not conduct 
business.”72 The majority, in a 5:2 decision, interpreted the provision 
in tandem with a neighboring one, forbidding the employment of 
salary employees in days of rest—except when certain exceptions are 
granted73—concluding that the objects of regulation are the people 
operating the business, in contrast to the business itself. This 
interpretation furthers statutory harmony and realizes underlying 
purposes of the legal system by facilitating effective use of local 
government statutes, delegating discretion to regulate certain matters, 
including the operation of businesses on the Sabbath, to the authority 
most attentive to the needs of the affected communities.74 Sohlberg 
did not dispute that the majority’s interpretation may be anchored in 
the statutory language. However, turning again to an array of legislative 
history material, he found that the legislature’s intent was to force a 
unitary day of rest, Saturday, in the entire market. The only exception 
                                               
 70 Gini I, supra note 62, ¶¶ 54, 68 (Sohlberg, J.). 
 71 HCJFH 3660/17 Association of Merchants and Independents v. Minister 
of Interior (Oct. 26, 2017), available at 
https://supremedecisions.court.gov.il/Home/Download?path=HebrewVerdicts\1









 73 Id. § 9. 
 74 Association of Merchants, supra note 71, ¶¶ 25–32 (Naor, President); 
Municipalities Ordinance (New Version), §§ 249(20), 249(21). On local government 
law in Israel in general, see NAVOT 2007, supra note 65, at 180–85. 
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is the operation of entertainment venues, which were excluded as a 
political compromise.75 
The latest substantial installment in Justice Sohlberg’s 
alternative method is Rom v. The State of Israel, a case dealing with the 
Ministry of Health’s decision to forbid private, unlicensed “natural 
birth centers” from offering childbirth services.76 The interpretive 
question was whether the statute mandating that institutions providing 
“medical treatment” obtain a hospital license, extends to delivering 
babies.77 Concurring in judgment, in a 2:1 decision, Sohlberg answered 
in the affirmative.78 The dissent voiced concerns about women’s right 
to choose how to give birth, as “closely associated with the autonomy 
of every woman over her body,”79 an objective purpose that ought to 
be weighty. Sohlberg found irrelevant these “ethical and medical views 
about the nature of giving birth.”80 Consequently, he held that the 
balance reached by the state, between “personal autonomy and 
                                               
 75 Association of Merchants, supra note 71, ¶¶ 28–33 (Sohlberg, J., 
dissenting). 
 76 HCJ 5428/17 Rom v. State of Israel (June 18, 2018), available at 
https://supremedecisions.court.gov.il/Home/Download?path=HebrewVerdicts\1
7\280\054\j07&fileName=17054280.J07&type=4 [Hebrew]. Just like Gini (supra 
note 62), Rom too proved to be an extremely contentious decision, such that the 
current President of the Court, Justice Esther Hayut, ordered a “further hearing” 
procedure. HCJFH 5120/18 Women for Freedom of Choice in Childbirth v. State 
of Israel (hearing yet to be scheduled; last checked May 26, 2020). Association of 
Merchant was a further hearing as well, but the interpretive issues only arose in its 
second installment and so the decision to rehear the case had turned wholly on the 
substance. 
 77 Public Health Ordinance, 1940, §§ 24A(1), 24(b). 
 78 Rom, supra note 76, ¶¶ 8–9 (Sohlberg, J., concurring). There was no 
examination of legislative history nor could there have been, since the ordinance in 
question dates back to the British Mandate and was not enacted by the Israeli 
legislature. Possibly for this reason, Sohlberg’s analysis did not include an explicit 
contrast of subjective and objective purposes (the judge who wrote the principal 
opinion, Justice Elron, grounded his conclusion entirely in an administrative rather 
than interpretive examination). 
 79 Id. ¶ 34 (Grosskopf, J., dissenting). 
 80 Id. ¶ 10 (Sohlberg, J., concurring). 
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paternalistic considerations regarding public health and welfare,” 
warrants no judicial intervention.81 
Now, zooming out from these decisions to their bigger 
meaning. Sohlberg framed his disagreement with the prevailing theory 
as “not just about the question of what is the interpretation of the law; 
the root of the dispute is deeper, and it is entrenched in the question 
of the way in which the law should be interpreted.”82 This challenge 
was met in each of the three cases with reiterations of PI principles, in 
attempts to counter Sohlberg’s defiance. In Gini, his colleagues 
conjured up the American interpretive debate—then an 
unprecedented move in the Court’s history, and now already one of 
several83—comparing Sohlberg’s approach to originalism. This may be 
perplexing to the American reader, since the new theory elevates the 
role of legislative history, a liberal staple in the U.S. In order to explain 
why the intuition is, while crudely articulated, nonetheless correct, a 
deeper dive is necessary—into the methodological details as well as the 
values they express. Beginning with the former, PO poses fundamental 
challenges at each stage of the PI schema. Let us flesh them out one 
by one. 
Subjective Purpose: Justice Sohlberg’s theory does not dispute that 
language sets the boundaries for interpretation, even though, at least 
rhetorically, he favors a more limited textual space.84 Within these 
                                               
 81 Id. ¶ 12 (Sohlberg, J., concurring). 
 82 Association of Merchants, supra note 71, ¶ 2 (Sohlberg, J., dissenting) 
(emphases in the original). 
 83 Infra notes 284, 293–302 and accompanying text. 
 84 HCJ 6301/18 Poznansky-Katz v. Minister of Justice (Dec. 27, 2018), ¶¶ 
3–5 (Sohlberg, J.), available at 
https://supremedecisions.court.gov.il/Home/Download?path=HebrewVerdicts\1
8\010\063\m16&fileName=18063010.M16&type=4 [Hebrew] (Justice Sohlberg’s 
opinion ostensibly rests on the linguistic inability to read the term “temporary 
expulsion” into the term “removal from office”—and hence the disciplinary court 
for judges was not authorized to impose the former on a judge who had performed 
ethical misconduct. Yet Sohlberg’s reasoning was not strictly semantic, incorporating 
intentionalism already into the textual phase: “the legislature considered the issue and 
debated it. If he wanted to distinguish between ‘removal from office’ and ‘expulsion 
from office,’ he could have done so, like he did in other pieces of legislation. It is not 
neglect or mistake that led the legislature to choose this language, but conscious 
intention, and we are not free to read into the words what is not in them”). 
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boundaries, the ‘golden presumption’ that Barak’s PI uses for 
determining subjective purpose, is that the author’s will is fully 
expressed in the text.85 This presumption can be rebutted if external 
sources indicate a conflicting will with greater reliability.86 This is no 
longer the case with Sohlberg’s PO, which shifts the burden of 
proof—from the legislative history to the language. Legislative history 
should be given “a significant, and to my mind even conclusive, 
weight,”87 depending on the level of its reliability in reflecting the 
legislature’s intent. Instead of presuming that the text exhausts the 
author’s intent unless proven otherwise, he presumes legislative history 
expresses most credibly the legislative will, and it is enough that this 
intent has a hold in the text. Barak’s view that “[t]here is no source 
more credible and more appropriate for learning about authorial intent 
than the text itself”88 is replaced by a “bottom-up” interpretation that 
involves a “labor of ‘digging,’ often tedious.”89 Insofar as it clearly 
reflects the legislature’s will, legislative history outweighs the language. 
Sohlberg’s opinion in Association of Merchants exemplifies this 
shifting of the burden. After finding textual basis for each of the two 
opposing interpretations to the regulation of work on the Sabbath, the 
linguistic phase ends and the subjective purpose one begins—opening 
with legislative history.90 Within the subjective purpose then, the text 
no longer plays a significant role, and the author’s will is taken to reside 
in external sources, that only need to find accommodation in the 
words. This remains true even if the words themselves draw to a 
different direction, as the majority in Association of Merchants highlights 
and Sohlberg does not dispute.91 Once original intent, as delineated 
from legislative history, finds a hold in the text—PO is satisfied.92 
                                               
 85 Supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
 86 BARAK, PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION, supra note 25, at 144. 
 87 Gini II, supra note 62, ¶¶ 7–8 (Sohlberg, J., dissenting). 
 88 BARAK, PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION, supra note 25, at 135. 
 89 Association of Merchants, supra note 71, ¶¶ 2–13 (Sohlberg, J., dissenting). 
 90 Id. ¶ 6 (Sohlberg, J., dissenting). 
 91 Id. ¶ 43 (Naor, President); ¶¶ 8–9 (Barak-Erez, J., concurring); ¶¶ 5–6 
(Sohlberg, J., dissenting). 
 92 Gini II, supra note 62, ¶ 17 (Sohlberg, J., dissenting). 
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This approach signifies an openness to seeing the interpretive 
process as primarily an empirical-historical rather than a normative 
project: reasons become second to causes, and creation is tolerated 
only so long as it contributes to finding out what the best discovery 
is.93 In this respect it is the mirror image of the prevailing theory—PI 
uses no ‘golden presumption’ in ascertaining the objective purpose, 
and hence assigns a-priori primacy to normative considerations, as the 
‘system’s intent’ does not face the textual hurdles that the author’s 
intent faces. 
PO levels up the subjective purpose while simultaneously 
leveling down the objective purpose. Ostensibly, Justice Sohlberg seeks to 
“use interpretive tools to limit the ‘clash’ between ‘the will of the 
legislature’ and ‘the will of the system’”94—which is exactly the task of 
the purposive interpreter. However, Sohlberg perceives this task very 
differently, for he goes on to say: “before using the ‘doomsday weapon’ 
of judicial review.” This refers to what led the majority in Gini to its 
conclusion: the imperative to choose, out of all the subjective purposes 
the language can bear, those that do not conflict with the objective 
ones. The latter arrive at this meeting after being infused with the 
fundamental values of the system, like human rights, democracy, 
reasonableness, “justice, morality, and fairness,”95 via the “purposive 
presumptions.”96 Sohlberg resists this infusion, in American 
terminology, of interpretation with construction—what PI calls 
“synthesis and integration”97 is already an act of judicial review. 
Barak too asserts that “[m]eaning and validity [ . . . ] are two 
separate things,” but that doesn’t stop him from urging the purposive 
interpreter to “make every effort to avoid recognizing a contradiction 
[between individual and general objective purposes], because a 
contradiction would place the validity of the statute in question.”98 
                                               
 93 Cf. PI’s opposite approach, supra note 53. 
 94 Gini II, supra note 62, ¶ 20 (Sohlberg, J., dissenting). 
 95 BARAK, PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION, supra note 25, at 173. 
 96 Supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
 97 Supra note 37. 
 98 BARAK, PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION, supra note 25, at 365. A variation 
of the same principle in U.S. jurisprudence is the constitutional avoidance doctrine. 
See Rivka Weill & Tally Kritzman-Amir, Between Institutional Survival and Human Rights 
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Advocating a clearer boundary between determining the meaning of a 
statutory text and subjecting it to constitutional scrutiny, PO takes the 
“purposive presumptions” which Barak considers to be “the heart of 
legal interpretation,”99 as an adjudicative device alien to the 
interpretative process. In Justice Sohlberg’s words: “the law of ought 
replaces the law of is.”100 The upshot is that fundamental values cannot 
trump original intent within the interpretive process. Sohlberg made 
good on this promise in Rom. First, the role of human rights as 
interpretive devices was minimized in interpreting the meaning of the 
statutory text and determining its purpose. Second, on the basis of the 
interpretation already established, the legality of the balance of 
interests in the administrative decision was assessed.101 
In the ultimate purpose stage, PI’s language of equilibrium, 
synthesis, and proportionality is supplanted by a rule-and-exceptions 
model. What is offered is a collision, and then a conclusive method for 
declaring the winner—original intent. Thus, Sohlberg rejects the 
discretion-conferring approach of ultimate purpose construction that 
relies on various continuums. One such continuum is the 
chronological: the weight of the objective purpose grows with the 
passing of time.102 Justice Sohlberg clarified in Gini that he accepts this 
rule in principle, only in that case thirty-four years have passed since 
the enactment of the Kosher statute, and “the fundamental debate 
remains the same;” then as now the proper place for it is the Knesset 
floor.103 This envelopes a turn away from the empirical element PI does 
embrace—not as a replacement for normative considerations, but as a 
source for them: the social circumstances surrounding any given 
statute, from the period prior to its enactment until the time of 
interpretation. Sohlberg, as do the other judges in Gini, voices harsh 
criticism of the Chief Rabbinate’s regulatory operation, often found to 
                                               
Protection: Adjudicating Landmark Cases of African Undocumented Entrants in Israel in a 
Comparative and International Context, 41 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 43 (2019) (comparing the 
doctrine in Israel and the U.S., in the context of immigration detention). 
 99 BARAK, PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION, supra note 25, at 172. 
 100 Association of Merchants, supra note 71, ¶ 2 (Sohlberg, J., dissenting). 
 101 Supra notes 80–81 and accompanying text. 
 102 Supra note 38. For a similar argument regarding American originalism, 
see Adam M. Samaha, Originalism’s Expiration Date, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1295 (2008). 
 103 Gini II, supra note 62, ¶¶ 22–24 (Sohlberg, J., dissenting). 
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be corrupt.104 Yet, despite the recognition of a shift in the public 
attitude toward the legal scheme, exemplified by the “private 
supervision” project the petitioners take part in, and the sound basis 
for that shift—these facts do not suffice, because the social conflict 
from which the legal question stems is still unresolved. 
The bar for the exception to overcome the rule is therefore 
very high: time need to have rendered the friction between the 
subjective and the objective purposes redundant. This entails a 
practical erosion of another of the ultimate purpose continuums: a 
change in the character of the legal regime. Between the enactment of 
the Kosher statute and its interpretation, the Constitutional Revolution 
occurred and seemingly elevated the status of individual rights. Per PO, 
this latter element, while prima facie retained in constitutional review, 
enjoys no resonance within the interpretive process. 
Sohlberg’s Association of Merchants dissent runs further along 
this current in its reluctance to assign normative weight to prior 
interpretations of the Court to a given statute, inasmuch as they do not 
amount to a binding precedent that settles the legal question. In that 
case, concurring Justice Barak-Erez stressed that a statute should not 
be read as a “blank slate.”105 Considering post-enactment history, as PI 
requires, she referred to the way the welfare law has traditionally been 
interpreted by courts and implemented by local governments. Sohlberg 
also thought the statute should not be interpreted “in a vacuum,” but 
he referred solely to the social background at the time of enactment of 
the interpreted provision (1968–1969).106 Save for stare decisis, the 
empirical-historical project of PO is confined to the history leading to 
the creation of the text, and there it ends. This is antithetical to Barak’s 
view that the subjective purpose is important not so much in its own 
sake, but because “we need the past to understand the present.”107 
                                               
 104 Gini I, supra note 62, ¶¶ 70–72 (Sohlberg, J.); ¶¶ 1–2, 14 (Rubinstein, J.); 
¶ 22 (Shoham, J.). 
 105 Association of Merchants, supra note 71, ¶ 18 (Barak-Erez, J., 
concurring). 
 106 Id. ¶ 8 (Sohlberg, J., dissenting). 
 107 BARAK, PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION, supra note 25, at 190. 
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The result is that the subjective purpose should be ruled 
superior when it is “reliable, certain and clear,” including in the case 
that the legislature’s intent has no explicit basis in the statutory text but 
can still be accommodated with it.108 Any other conclusion confuses 
interpretation with judicial review, continued Sohlberg, since 
determining the statute’s purpose, and determining its 
constitutionality109—are two different stages that must be divorced: 
“interpretation deals with the law that is; judicial review deals with the 
law that ought (not) to be.”110 Unconstitutionality is thus a second 
exception to the triumph of intent. The Constitutional Revolution 
justifies the banishment of normative construction from the 
interpretive process,111 because the Court’s authority to strike down 
statutes that offend human rights creates a binary judicial route to 
determine the constitutionality of a statute. Inasmuch as it is not 
unconstitutional, the result of the subjective purpose inquiry should 
prevail.112 
To summarize PO from a purely methodological perspective, 
PI’s triangle of “language, purpose, discretion”113 is replaced with a 
                                               
 108 Gini II, supra note 62, ¶¶ 7–8, 15–17 (Sohlberg, J., dissenting). 
 109 The constitutionality of the Kashrut (Prohibition of Deceit) Law was 
scrutinized in Gini I, as the petitioners raised an alternative argument to the 
interpretive one, claiming that the statute should be struck down due to its 
unconstitutional infringement on freedom of occupation. This argument was 
rejected unanimously. The reason constitutional review was conducted only on the 
basis of freedom of occupation and not other constitutional rights, is that Basic Law: 
Human Dignity and Liberty’s savings clause, unlike the one in Basic Law: Freedom 
of Occupation, has no expiration date (supra note 17). While these Basic Laws were 
enacted in 1992, the statute under scrutiny had already been on the books since 1983 
(supra note 66). 
 110 Gini II, supra note 62, ¶ 16 (Sohlberg, J., dissenting). See also Poznansky-
Katz, supra note 84, ¶ 3 (Sohlberg, J.). 
 111 While the distinction Sohlberg insists on is similar to that between 
interpretation and construction (see Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, 34 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 65 (2011)), he refers more specifically to the act of 
scrutinizing a statute in order to determine its constitutionality, according to the tests 
of the limitation clause (supra note 15 and accompanying text). 
 112 Gini II, supra note 62, ¶¶ 15–21 (Sohlberg, J., dissenting). 
 113 Supra note 42. 
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triangle of language, original intent, validation.114 What facilitates this 
scheme is the elevation of legislative history from a secondary source 
for the subjective purpose to the primary interpretive tool the judge 
has at her disposal. Thus, at the subjective purpose stage, the textual 
source is no longer assigned primacy; at the objective purpose stage, 
fundamental values are removed from the interpretive realm, instead 
consigned to the realm of judicial review; and at the ultimate purpose 
stage, the subjective purpose wins unless it is unconstitutional or 
obsolete. While stemming from PI and sharing its general framework, 
the basic governing principle of this new method is the legislature’s 
original intent, and hence: Purposive Originalism.115 
Justice Sohlberg is the first Barak challenger to devote his 
energy to the same aspect of the judicial enterprise as Barak himself—
a comprehensive method of interpretation. Yet he is in no way engaged 
in an idiosyncratic project. First, because he also joins previous anti-
Barak efforts championed by former members of the Court.116 These 
were attempts to promote judicial restraint by non-interpretive means, 
such as limited scrutiny over executive actions,117 or stricter threshold 
                                               
 114 On the element of validation, see infra notes 256–260 and accompanying 
text. 
 115 It shares the title and general orientation, but not the details, of Abotsi, 
supra note 10 (defining the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Ghana as 
incorporating originalist elements into a generally purposive scheme of constitutional 
interpretation). 
 116 See Isaac Roszler, Law as a Prism into National Identity: The Case of Mishpat 
Ivri 38 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 715, 744–50 (2017) (on Justice Menachem Elon); 
FRIEDMANN, supra note 11, at 184–85 (on Justice Eliezer Rivlin); Ittai Bar-Siman-
Tov, John Hart Grunis? The Jurisprudence of Chief Justice Grunis in Light of Ely’s 
Constitutional Theory, 9 DIN UDVARIM 67 (2015) [Hebrew] (on Justice Asher Grunis); 
Ely Aaronson, Judging as Polemic, 9 MISHPAT UMIMSHAL 497, 515–39 (2006) [Hebrew] 
(on Justice Mishael Cheshin. Hints of originalist tendencies have been detected in 
Justice Cheshin’s jurisprudence. Yair Sagy, The Ruling that Made History: A 
Historiographic Analysis of the Mizrahi Bank Decision, 19 MISHPAT UMIMSHAL 325, 380 
n.279 (2018) [Hebrew]). 
 117 Sohlberg, On Subjective Values, supra note 63, at 44–55; HCJ 4374/15 The 
Movement for Quality Government v. Prime Minister of Israel (Mar. 27, 2016), 
available at 
https://supremedecisions.court.gov.il/Home/Download?path=HebrewVerdicts\1
5\740\043\t63&fileName=15043740.T63&type=4 [Hebrew]; a summary of the 
case in English is available at 
2020 Rise of American Conservatism in Israel 8:2 
411 
requirements for review.118 Second, because Sohlberg has been joined 
by newer members of the Court who turn to American conservative 
jurisprudence, particularly via interpretive means. As we shall see in 
section III.B.2. below, some of whom, especially Justice Alex Stein, 
promote a very direct incorporation of such theories into Israeli law.119 
Unsurprisingly, legal commentators in the media have begun speaking 
of a “conservative camp,” spearheaded by Sohlberg.120 The imperative 
to investigate the meaning of such a development cannot be 
overstated. 
III. AMERICAN-ISRAELI CONSERVATISM 
There is a dialogue to be constructed between Purposive 
Originalism and paradigmatic shifts currently taking place in the Israeli 
political arena, both connoting American conservatism. Granted, no 
causal connection can be detected between PO and developments in 
American jurisprudence.121 In this it differs from PI, which has been 
                                               
http://versa.cardozo.yu.edu/sites/default/files/upload/opinions/Movement%20f
or%20Quality%20Government%20v.%20Prime%20Minister_0.pdf. 
 118 HCJ 5744/16 Ben Meir v. The Knesset (May 27, 2018), ¶¶ 4–15 
(Sohlberg, J., concurring), available at 
https://supremedecisions.court.gov.il/Home/Download?path=HebrewVerdicts\1
6\440\057\v17&fileName=16057440.V17&type=4 [Hebrew] (on ripeness); AAA 
3782/12 Chief of Tel Aviv-Jaffa District, Israel Police v. Israeli Internet Society (Mar. 
24, 2013), ¶¶ 10–12 (Sohlberg, J., dissenting), available at 
https://supremedecisions.court.gov.il/Home/Download?path=HebrewVerdicts\1
2\820\037\o07&fileName=12037820_o07.txt&type=4 [Hebrew] (on standing). 
 119 Infra notes 284, 293–302 and accompanying text. 
 120 Gil Bringer, The Disappointing New Conservatives: Why Conservative Judges are 
Criticized by the Right, GLOBES (Sept. 13, 2019), 
https://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1001300543 [Hebrew]; Doron 
Nehemia, The Ruling that Proves the Supreme Court is Beginning to Undergo Activism Rehab, 
THEMARKER (Aug. 13, 2019), https://www.themarker.com/opinion/.premium-
1.7680331 [Hebrew]. 
 121 While I make no claim with respect to Justice Sohlberg’s personal 
motivations—and would doubt that he consciously appealed to American 
Conservatism—it is still very reasonable that there is such a causal connection, for 
several reasons. First, the explicit comparison drawn by Sohlberg’s colleagues and 
his own rejoinder clarify that the Justices on the Supreme Court of Israel are familiar 
with the American debate and find it to be a relevant point of reference for their own 
circumstances. Second, American jurisprudence has significant influence over Israeli 
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since its inception clearly immersed in American legal liberalism. 
Given, however, that the conservative backlash against legal liberalism 
in the U.S. culminated in alternative interpretive theories,122 and that 
such a theory is being developed in Israel, this invites an exploration 
of the conceptual proximity between them. What follows is the argument 
that both responses share some key features, and, furthermore, that 
both have not presented themselves, to paraphrase Sohlberg, in a 
vacuum.123 Rather, there is an ongoing political project in Israel 
whereby American conservatism serves as a source of inspiration for 
the political Right, on various levels. The potential transition in the 
judiciary which PO signals can be better understood against this 
backdrop, as one that echoes the transition the American judiciary 
witnessed over three decades ago. The analogy thus provides a 
framework in which to examine the state of affairs in the Israeli 
judiciary and a vocabulary for its evaluation. Moreover, the analogy 
may help, in light of the above, to predict where the Israeli debate may 
go from here. Even more than its emergence, the conditions 
surrounding PO may facilitate its success. 
A. American Conservatism 
Conservatism denotes primarily a political philosophy—
prescribing how best to conduct the public life of a community, based 
on descriptive and normative propositions about the nature of the 
                                               
academia, which Sohlberg engages with in lectures and talks and wherefrom his 
clerks freshly arrive at his chambers each year. Israeli legal education has been 
modeled after elite U.S. law schools, and the latter are the foremost destination for 
advanced legal studies for aspiring academics. Lahav, American Moment[s], supra note 
46; Celia Wasserstein Fassberg, Comment on Pnina Lahav, American Moment[s], 10 
THEORETICAL INQ. L. F. 58 (2009). Third and relatedly, U.S. law has been 
increasingly cited in Israeli Supreme Court rulings since the 1980s, now roughly 
equaling the number of citations of all English commonwealth jurisdictions together 
(non-common law jurisdictions are seldomly cited). Cohn, supra note 20; Yoram 
Shachar, The Supreme Court’s Space of Reliance, 1950–2004, 50 HAPRAKLIT 29, 45–52 
(2008) [Hebrew]; RUBINSTEIN, supra note 24, at 192–215. For concrete examples, see 
supra note 8. Indeed, the growing American influence over Israeli legal education and 
research has induced calls for caution in importing American theories into Israeli law. 
Aviram, supra note 8; Haim Sandberg, Cultural Colonialism: The Americanization of Legal 
Education in Israel, 14 HAMISHPAT 419, 429–31 (2011) [Hebrew]. 
 122 Infra notes 159–167 and accompanying text. 
 123 Supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
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individual, the collective, and the interaction between them. Derived 
from these general propositions are more specific directives for the 
organization of political and social institutions. The precise substance 
of these prescriptions is, however, notoriously difficult to ascertain, as 
conservatism has been termed “one of the most confusing words in 
the glossary of political thought,”124 and an ‘essentially contested 
concept.’125 This is due in part to the fact that conservatism is not just 
a strictly political position, but rather a more comprehensive world-
view, encompassing preferences in diverse realms such as the social, 
the economic and the legal. Persons and groups subscribe to this 
world-view as a matter of identity. As such, conservatism is liberalism’s 
only competitor of equal scope and viability in contemporary Global 
North public life.126 
As a category of legal analysis, Ernest Young suggests that 
conservatism should be separated into three distinct branches: 
situational (a dispositional resistance to change); political (a first-order 
conception of the good); and institutional (a second-order view about 
proper organization of societal decision-making).127 Although useful, 
this typology is ultimately unsatisfactory, because it neglects to track 
the historical and analytical connections between these positions. It is 
precisely its insistence on treating these different conservatisms as part 
of one project—in spite of the inner tensions that Young 
                                               
 124 CLINTON ROSSITER, CONSERVATISM IN AMERICA 5 (2d ed. 1962), cited in 
Donald Elfenbein, The Myth of Conservatism as a Constitutional Philosophy, 71 IOWA L. 
REV. 401, 422 n.116 (1986). 
 125 See W. B. Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, 56 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN 
SOC’Y 167 (1956) (introducing the category ‘essentially contested concept’); Simon J. 
Evnine, Essentially Contested Concepts and Semantic Externalism, 8 J. PHIL. HIST. 118 
(2014) (applying it to conservatism); Iain MacKenzie, The Idea of Ideology, in ROBERT 
ECCLESHALL ET AL., POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES: AN INTRODUCTION 1, 7 (3rd ed. 
2003) (same). 
 126 Liberalism is also fraught with inner conflicts, but arguably less so. Carl 
T. Bogus, Fighting over the Conservative Banner, in NOMOS LVI: AMERICAN 
CONSERVATISM 336, 337 (Sanford V. Levinson et al. eds., 2016); but cf. Ruth Abbey, 
Is Liberalism Now an Essentially Contested Concept?, 27 NEW POL. SCI. 461 (2005) 
(discussing liberalism as an essentially contested concept). 
 127 Ernest A. Young, Judicial Activism and Conservative Politics, 73 COLO. L. 
REV. 1139, 1182–203 (2002). 
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identifies128—which makes American conservatism stand out, as an all-
encompassing framework that joins personal beliefs, policy 
preferences, and institutional design into an ideology. Accordingly, the 
following discussion will be divided along slightly different lines. It 
begins by describing conservatism as a political ideology, and then 
delineates how the same underlying values translate into legal doctrine 
in the interpretive realm. 
1. As Political Ideology 
In American political life, conservatism as it is known today 
had emerged against the backdrop of the Cold War and reached its 
heyday during the Reagan administration.129 In public policy terms, it 
is a composite of three major strands: social, economic, and national 
security conservatisms.130 
Social conservatism is grounded chiefly in tradition. Skeptical of 
human rationality, the traditionalist view rejects abstract ideals such as 
individual natural rights in favor of an organic conception of social 
collectivity, which develops in an evolutionary fashion dictated by 
ancestral wisdom. Such a social order, which derives moral authority 
from existing tradition, custom, and culture—including social 
hierarchies—is preferred over a political one manufactured by 
application of deductive reasoning.131 For social conservatism, the 
                                               
 128 Id. at 1203–09. 
 129 Andrew J. Perrin et al., From Coalition to Constraint: Modes of Thought in 
Contemporary American Conservatism, 29 SOC. F. 285, 286–87 (2014); Julian E. Zelizer, 
Rethinking the History of American Conservatism, 38 REV. AM. HIST. 367, 368 (2010). See 
generally NOMOS LVI, supra note 126; THE DILEMMAS OF AMERICAN CONSERVATISM 
(Kenneth L. Deutsch & Ethan Fishman eds., 2010); GEORGE H. NASH, THE 
CONSERVATIVE INTELLECTUAL MOVEMENT IN AMERICA SINCE 1945 (30th 
anniversary ed. 2006); JONATHAN M. SCHOENWALD, A TIME FOR CHOOSING: THE 
RISE OF MODERN AMERICAN CONSERVATISM (2001). 
 130 James R. Kurth, A History of Inherent Contradictions: The Origins and End of 
American Conservatism, in NOMOS LVI, supra note 126, at 13, 14. 
 131 Bruce P. Frohnen, Law’s Culture: Conservativism and the American 
Constitutional Order, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 459, 461–63 (2004); Ernest Young, 
Rediscovering Conservatism: Burkean Political Theory and Constitutional Interpretation, 72 N.C. 
L. REV. 619, 642–59 (1994). The traditionalist strand of conservatism, championed 
in the U.S. by Russell Kirk and others, and often understood as exhaustive of the 
conservative frame elsewhere, builds on the thought of English philosopher and 
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good is predicated on time-honored institutions and dogmas that form 
a proper basis for public virtue. Social conservatism manifests mainly 
in cherishing ‘traditional Judeo-Christian values’ as pertaining to social 
institutions like religion and the family. 
Economic conservatism’s intellectual infrastructure is very 
different, couched in libertarian theories of economic laissez-faire and 
neo-liberalism.132 The goal is to promote freedom defined as the 
absence of coercion—therefore favoring both small government and 
free market. Because coercion necessarily boils down to governmental 
paternalism,133 libertarians apply the logic of deregulation to various 
economic and political settings.134 
Libertarianism stands in tension with traditionalism, because it 
assigns primacy to right over virtue, favors negative liberty, and trusts 
human rationality.135 The third conservative school of thought, from 
which national security conservatism draws, neoconservatism, strives for 
reconciliation. One of neoconservatism’s notable articulators, Irving 
Kristol, identified its core as support for free market economy situated 
within a narrative of organic collectivity. Minimum bureaucratic 
intrusion into the individual’s affairs safeguards their liberty, yet the 
idea that individuals “can ‘create’ their own values and then 
incorporate them into a satisfying ‘lifestyle’” is met with skepticism.136 
Instead, values are generated by traditional institutions like “religion, 
                                               
politician Edmund Burke. See, e.g., YUVAL LEVIN, THE GREAT DEBATE: EDMUND 
BURKE, THOMAS PAINE, AND THE BIRTH OF RIGHT AND LEFT (2013). For a survey 
of conflicting interpretations of Burke, see NASH, supra note 129, at 251–56. 
 132 Or ‘classical liberalism,’ as opposed to the welfare liberalism advocated 
by scholars of legal liberalism. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, THE CLASSICAL LIBERAL 
CONSTITUTION (2014). 
 133 FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 11–21 (1960). 
 134 NASH, supra note 129, at 238–43; Ethan Fishman & Kenneth L. Deutsch, 
Introduction, in DILEMMAS OF AMERICAN CONSERVATISM, supra note 129, at 1, 2–3; 
Perrin et al., supra note 139, at 291. 
 135 These tensions may nonetheless be reconcilable. For instance, by 
suggesting that virtue can only or best be achieved by participation in the free market. 
See Zelizer, supra note 129, at 372. 
 136 Irving Kristol, What Is “Neoconservative”?, in THE NEOCONSERVATIVE 
PERSUASION: SELECTED ESSAYS, 1942–2009 148, 149 (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed., 
2011). 
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the family, the ‘high culture’ of Western civilization.”137 Active 
protection of the latter is a special emphasis of neoconservatism, 
enshrining the use of force in service of “American ideals.”138 
Neoconservatism highlights strong nationalist sentiments and seeks to 
cultivate intra-societal cohesion through the dichotomy of friend 
versus foe, hence supporting militaristic agendas and hawkish 
formulations of patriotism. 
Each of these political stances correlates at bottom with a 
specific set of philosophical convictions and their intellectual sources, 
although the nexuses are not seamless.139 Thus, traditionalists cherish 
American exceptionalism as a preservation of entrenched values and a 
prudent continuation of existing practice, inspired by classical virtues 
of hard work and good character in a communal setting.140 Local 
associations and communities flourish in such soil.141 Libertarians, on 
the other hand, espouse the Lockean framework of natural rights and 
construe American sovereignty as aspiring to safeguard the individual 
against tyranny. This conception of freedom is, however, 
complemented by an approach to social interaction neighboring the 
traditionalist one. The proper climate for persons to pursue their own 
ends is a “spontaneous order,” which arises without top-bottom design 
but rather via voluntary associations and exchanges, i.e. the invisible 
hand.142 Leo Strauss, a major influence on neoconservatism, lamented 
the absence of objective standards for recognizing and advancing what 
is naturally good in public life. He thus understood “natural rights” 
differently from the social contract tradition, as a universal truth about 
the best way to live, which was espoused by the Founding Fathers but 
later abandoned in favor of individualism and relativism.143 The 
content of this framework is that “nature is essentially hierarchical,” an 
                                               
 137 Id. 
 138 Max Boot, Neocons, FOREIGN POL’Y, Jan.–Feb. 2004, at 20, 24 (adding 
that the question of whether the U.S. should actively and forcefully export its ideals, 
is a matter of controversy among neoconservatives). 
 139 See Bogus, supra note 126, at 336; Jonathan O’Neill, Constitutional 
Conservatism and American Conservatism, in NOMOS LVI, supra note 126, at 292, 319–20. 
 140 Frohnen, supra note 131, at 466–69. 
 141 Id. at 476; see also O’Neill, supra note 139, at 305–06. 
 142 O’Neill, supra note 139, at 308–14; see also A. I. Ogus, Law and Spontaneous 
Order: Hayek’s Contribution to Legal Theory, 16 J.L. & SOC. 393 (1989). 
 143 O’Neill, supra note 139, at 314–20. 
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inegalitarianism determined by substantive value properly assigned to 
people’s lives.144 
While it is unclear how solid the alliance remains in the age of 
Trump,145 this is still the general framework in which conservative 
commitments are navigated and merged into a cohesive whole, as far 
as possible.146 The major common theoretical denominators are an 
organic conception of society across time; emphasis on the concrete 
circumstances of political collectives, rooted in their time and place; 
and natural human inequality.147 These allow all three conservatisms to 
efficiently coalesce in the political realm, in order to promote shared 
goal and oppose shared enemies. The latter consists mostly of civil 
rights struggles. For instance, those directed at liberating vulnerable 
members of the family, such as women or LGBT children, from the 
hold of its patriarch. If successful, such struggles push the welfare state 
into the household, taking over the responsibility for its members’ 
well-being, and severing any necessary ties between a person’s heritage 
and their chosen way of life.148 Thus, despite the very different 
philosophical motivations—reliance on ancestral wisdom for 
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traditionalists, moral Darwinism for libertarians,149 and a quest for a 
nationalist common good for neoconservatives—the upshot is 
common discontent with redistributional schemes and progressive 
design of public policy heralded by espousing the vantage point of 
underprivileged groups. Other common causes are “tough” policies on 
crime and immigration, and deregulation of private ownership of 
firearms. In the light of the landmark originalist decision in D.C. v. 
Heller,150 this latter issue epitomizes the conceptual and historical ties 
between political and judicial conservatism.151 
The connecting link between politics and adjudication is the 
relevant law. The U.S. Constitution is central to all conservative 
strands. It advances and reconciles these visions by securing the rule 
of law, which guarantees the stability and certainty necessary for free 
transactions; protecting the boundaries of each person’s possessions 
and entitlements to create a secure climate for inter-subjective 
transactional conduct; and promising constraints on institutional 
planning for the entire political community, by keeping powers 
separate.152 The Constitution facilitates a higher moral order that ought 
to transcend state institutions and keep personal responsibility from 
being shunned by top-down designs. It additionally provides a 
document of perpetual relevance to rely upon for guidance. As Justice 
Scalia asserts, it has an intrinsic “antirevolutionary purpose.”153 Thus, 
per American conservatism, decades of progressive policies that 
aspired for false egalitarianism and a welfare state have distorted the 
original Constitution produced in the Founding era.154 The way it 
ought to be used is rather as a vehicle for containment of change. 
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2. As Judicial Ideology 
The most straightforward manner to adjudicate conservatively 
is to issue decisions whose results would be favorable to political 
conservatives. In this vein, scholars such as Cass Sunstein and Robin 
West have argued that juridical camps ultimately divide along lines of 
political orientation.155 West concedes that conservative jurists may 
hold principled jurisprudential views, but they all ultimately reach 
similar results because their different jurisprudences justify in different 
ways the same conception of the good: conservatives of all strands 
assign high value to forms of social and private power that are 
grounded in communitarian wisdom and preservation of hierarchies.156 
They distrust centralized power so long as it is used for redistribution 
purposes, in lieu of “a duty to promote, protect, and encourage that 
form of life reflected in the community’s social structures and 
preexisting entitlements.”157 It follows from such views that the best 
way to gauge judicial conservatism is by outcomes. 
Empirical evidence lends support to this approach.158 In 
tandem with the formation of modern American conservatism in the 
political sphere, a judicial one was formed as well. Against the 
backdrop of legal liberalism, by the 1980s the recognition that 
constitutional adjudication can hardly be politically neutral reemerged 
among both conservatives and progressives.159 But only the former 
group was in power. The backlash against legal liberalism orchestrated 
by the Reagan administration placed an unprecedented premium, for 
                                               
 155 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, A CONSTITUTION OF MANY MINDS 20–23 (2009); 
West, supra note 149, at 648. 
 156 West, supra note 149, at 643. See also Young, Judicial Activism, supra note 
127, at 1187–97 (discussing political as opposed to situational and institutional 
conservatism). 
 157 West, supra note 149, at 653. 
 158 NEAL DEVINS & LAWRENCE BAUM, THE COMPANY THEY KEEP: HOW 
PARTISAN DIVISIONS CAME TO THE SUPREME COURT (2019); Daniel R. Pinello, 
Linking Party to Judicial Ideology in American Courts: A Meta-Analysis, 20 JUST. SYS. J. 219 
(1999). See also Joshua B. Fischman & Tonja Jacobi, The Second Dimension of the Supreme 
Court, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1671 (2015) (arguing that alongside the left/right 
ideological continuum, judges’ positions on a legalism/pragmatism continuum are 
also empirically significant). 
 159 West, supra note 149; KALMAN, supra note 44, at 132–33. 
2020 Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 8:2 
420 
political purposes, first on the judiciary in general, and second on 
interpretive methodology in particular.160 The successful campaign to 
“undo the Warren Court legacy,”161 which resulted in a “paradigmatic 
shift” in American legal discourse,162 was anchored in conservative 
interpretive methods, newly articulated in response to the liberal ones. 
Hence, the failed nomination of Judge Robert Bork to the Supreme 
Court in 1987, instilling the term originalism in the public 
consciousness, was nonetheless a success.163 Since that time, the 
process of judicial appointment to the federal bench, rendered 
inherently political by the Constitution,164 has grown increasingly 
divisive. The interpretive theory judges adhere to is a central 
manifestation of the split between conservatives and liberals. 
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Methodology appears as transcending policy arguments, 
utilizing neutral language as a basis “for attacking wide swaths of 
judicial doctrine at once.”165 Orienting judicial integrity along 
interpretive methodology lines turns methodological gaps into 
ideological polarization, lest judges’ rulings be perceived as 
inconsistent, subjective, and ironically, political.166 It demands 
methodological purism of judges on both sides. Yet if originalism and 
textualism are viewed, like any other judicial method, as mere vessels 
for effective channeling of discretion behind a veil of objectivity and 
constraint, then their audience may not be the legal community at all. 
Indeed, Margaret Lemos claims that laypeople who lack the capacity 
or the will to look behind the veil, are “the consumers of the shell 
game.”167 Under this light, the link between conservatism and 
interpretive methods is a marriage of convenience. Methodology is 
chosen in order to rationalize ideology-driven results and internalize 
them into the legal doctrine. 
But adjudication may also realize conservative values 
intrinsically rather than instrumentally. Three inter-related tenets lie at 
the crux of conservative jurisprudence in the U.S.: originalism, bright-
line rules, and deference.168 The unifying theme of this threefold 
framework is majoritarianism,169 and the goal is primarily to resolve the 
counter-majoritarian difficulty and limit judicial discretion by requiring 
an adherence to the value judgments of the representative branches of 
government.170 
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Originalism, which applies exclusively to constitutional 
interpretation, was at its origin intentionalism: setting the judge on a 
historical quest to figure out the original intent of the Framers and 
restricting interpretive legitimacy to these boundaries.171 It was tied by 
its adherents to judicial restraint, as a direct response to legal liberalism. 
This was also a time when the Right prevailed politically, and hence 
controlled the non-judicial decision-making mechanisms deferred 
to.172 Today, originalism is a family of theories united by two core 
principles: that the meaning of the Constitution is fixed; and that the 
interpreter is constrained by it.173 The most notable variation 
substitutes original intent with original public meaning. The 
interpretive endeavor is still ideally an empirical-historical one, only 
now the fact it tracks is meaning rather than intent.174 The focus shifts 
to the potential understanding of the governed, whose consent 
legitimized political authority, at the historical moment in which this 
consent materialized. 
In any variation, originalism is a conservative method of 
interpretation, because political settlements of past generations are 
given binding normative force.175 Predicating legitimate authority on 
popular consent is a liberal principle, placing the judicial focus on the 
ordinary citizen entering the social contract instead of the expert 
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authority, and hence public meaning rather than intent.176 Nonetheless, 
this formalization of democracy is sharply at odds with legal liberalism. 
For legal liberalism attunes this same principle to evolving social 
realities. It does not rely on a contractarian view of democracy that is 
devoid of substance and that remains transfixed by the settlements of 
past generations.177 Legal liberalism strives to rule by the will of the 
governed while still advancing the value of progress, holding on to a 
belief in inalienable natural rights, and refusing to reduce ought to is.178 
For liberals, the normative force of consent is a rational construction; 
for conservatives, it is a historical fact. The Founding Fathers were 
committed both to the idea of progress and to the idea of tradition, 
and sought to implement both in the Constitution.179 But these two 
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values place tensions on each other. Rationalization of history 
disorders and destabilizes, demanding radical changes that defy 
tradition.180 Originalism chooses tradition over progress, by focusing 
exclusively on the social contract’s forefather-reverential “preservation 
clause” rather than its intergenerational “innovation clause.”181 
Favoring will over reason, originalism expresses “a model of history 
divorced from the idea of progress.”182 
There are analytical as well as historical ties between liberalism, 
progress, and secularization (all value reform), versus conservatism, 
dogma, and religion (all value orthodoxy). As Morton Horwitz 
explains, “constitutional law is the successor to religion and religious 
categories in an increasingly secularized society. Originalism in 
constitutional doctrine shares the same psychological yearning for 
certainty that religious fundamentalism does.”183 Just as conservatism 
as a political ideology aims to restore something of value that has been 
lost, namely conservatives are victims of progress,184 so does 
originalism resists change in constitutional meaning: “Originalists are 
busy at restoring the ideal by narrowing the perceived gap between the 
ideal and the real.”185 
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Hence, an originalist method may yield outcomes associated 
with liberalism/progressivism as a policy matter (for example, freedom 
from religion), and an evolutionary method may similarly produce 
conservative outcomes.186 Nevertheless, an evolutionary method of the 
legal liberalism mold cannot be intrinsically conservative. For it views 
the ontological status of legal meaning as always already dependent on 
a rational, teleological dialogue between interpreter and text.187 
Conversely, an originalist method cannot be intrinsically liberal, as it 
believes meaning to be independent of this hermeneutic dialogue.188 
Originalism enables subjection of present generations to the 
preferences of past ones. It thereby construes society as an entity 
superior to the individuals comprising it,189 and translates stagnation 
and dogma into interpretive doctrine. This facilitates a reconciliation 
of institutional preferences for majoritarianism with ideological 
positions favoring conservative values. These values can be of a more 
abstract nature, like order, prudence, moderation, and harmony; and 
more concrete, like social hierarchy (most social groups had no 
franchise when ratification took place), tradition (legal structures are 
revered just by virtue of being generated by the forefathers’ will), and 
responsibility (don’t like it? change it!). Consider the value of security. 
While a basic human desire and an aspiration of most political 
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schemes,190 security is held in particularly high regard by all 
conservatives, translating into both social values like safety,191 and legal 
ones like certainty and stability. Jurisprudential conservatism advances 
all. Originalism ensures that reform is undertaken only “piecemeal and 
with caution,” substituting ideology with the “normative force of 
history” (stability).192 Deference overlooks infringements on rights, 
allowing the government to promote national security (safety). Bright-
line rules reject the premium living constitutionalists put on political 
morality, instead facilitating the narrower originalist prism that is 
content with knowing what to look for (certainty).193 
Indeed, originalism is only one part of a larger adjudicative 
project. Both judicial and academic originalists see it as a special case 
of textualism,194 a helpful framing for understanding how 
interpretation ties in to the other basic tenets of conservative 
jurisprudence, formalism, and deference. The “whole purpose” of a 
Constitution, in Justice Scalia’s mind, is to prevent change.195 Scalia 
insisted that not only the Constitution, but also “statutes do not 
change.”196 The twin originalist convictions, that the meaning of the 
law is fixed and that the judge is constrained by it, are true for statutory 
interpretation too.197 
This framing invites the question of whether statutory 
textualism should also be considered a conservative theory. For the 
purposes of this Article, it is not necessary to provide a definitive 
answer to this question.198 But it is necessary to address the most 
significant variation between constitutional and statutory variations of 
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textualism, and that is the status of legislative history199—a central 
component of PO. This interpretive device has some place in any 
version of a purposive approach, favored by liberals. Textualists 
generally reject its use, yet they do embrace it in originalist 
constitutional interpretation, rendering them “semanticists in statutory 
cases, but historicists in constitutional cases.”200 For even in its 
original-meaning rather than original-intent phase, originalism heavily 
relies on deliberation history to ascertain binding meaning,201 as well as 
on other sources external to the text, read by the judge for the purpose 
of understanding fixed meanings at fixed times.202 This constitutes a 
“conservative bias,”203 warranting an application not only of a 
centuries-old moral vision, but one that took for granted the exclusion 
of most groups in society from the political body.204 Fixed meaning is 
complemented by fixed political identity. Statutory textualism, on the 
other hand, denies the relevance of legislative history altogether,205 and 
uses instead various canons and presumptions.206 
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There is a tension here with respect to conservative 
principles.207 On the one hand, the legislature is deemed an institution 
more closely attached than the judiciary to ordinary people, as its 
members are elected by the popular sovereign. The legislature more 
accurately reflects “the actual practices of society,” as Scalia put it.208 
This assertion is both deferential and formalist. It is an efficient way to 
produce clear and categorical rules, consistent with the rule of law 
which is “about form [ . . . formalism] is what makes a government a 
government of laws and not of men.”209 At the same time, the 
conservative reverence for social hierarchies and concern for stability 
fosters suspicion toward legislatures. Legislation is a process of 
communal plan-making for the future, carrying high potential for 
disruption of order and flattening of natural differences.210 
Adjudicative law as such is a conservative project, substantively and 
procedurally. The morality absorbed in the judicial process is “almost 
invariably conventional and traditional, rather than aspirational or 
utopian,” as West explains, because it is “profoundly elitist, hierarchic, 
and nonparticipatory [ . . . ] the antithesis of participatory democratic 
politics.”211 Indeed, from Blackstone through Hayek to contemporary 
policy-makers in developing countries,212 common law adjudication 
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HARV. L. REV. 1298 (2018); James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Liberal Justices’ 
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& LAB. L. 117 (2008). 
 207 Young describes this tension as one between the situational (anti-
revolutionary) and the institutional (anti-administrative state) aspects of 
conservatism. Young, Judicial Activism, supra note 127, at 1197. 
 208 Scalia, Rule of Law, supra note 170, at 1184; see also Antonin Scalia, 
Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CINN. L. REV. 849, 854, 862 (1989). 
 209 Scalia, Common-Law, supra note 153, at 25. See also Jamal Greene, Rule 
Originalism, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 1639 (2016); Stephanos Bibas, Originalism and 
Formalism in Criminal Procedure: The Triumph of Justice Scalia, the Unlikely Friend of Criminal 
Defendants?, 94 GEO. L.J. 183 (2005); Young, Rediscovering Conservatism, supra note 131, 
at 706–08; Scalia, Rule of Law, supra note 170, at 1178, 1184. 
 210 See John Ferejohn, Legislation, Planning, and Deliberation, in COLLECTIVE 
WISDOM: PRINCIPLES AND MECHANISMS 95, 100–04 (Hélène Landemore & Jon 
Elster eds., 2012). 
 211 West, supra note 149, at 715 (emphasis in original); see also Broughton, 
supra note 179, at 25. 
 212 Jeremy Waldron, Legislation and the Rule of Law, 1 LEGISPRUDENCE 91 
(2015). 
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has been construed as a steady force of pre-existing tradition; an 
incremental evolution of order that responds to social reality from 
within rather than pre-planned by political authorities; and an 
articulation of the values of the local community, allowing its members 
to communicate and transact freely. The textualist utilization of 
common law maxims expresses such inclinations. Filtering 
adjudicative settlements through conventional canons accommodates 
the moderation-inducing features of common law. So, ultimately, it 
might be the case that the conservatism of textualism is simply the 
conservatism inherent in any common law system.213 
B. Israeli-American Conservatism  
1. As Judicial Ideology 
How does Purposive Originalism relate to American 
Conservatism? To begin connecting the dots, a brief recap of the 
central tenets of PO. It assigns legislative history conclusive weight in 
discerning a statute’s purpose, because it is the most reliable source to 
point at the original intent of the legislature. Meaning is therefore 
considered to be fixed. An inter-related implication is that the nature 
of the judicial task is an empirical-historical one. Accordingly, the bar 
for considerations of social change following enactment is raised 
significantly, and overarching values lose their status as guidelines for 
interpretation. Continuums and balances are replaced by binary, 
conclusion-generating formulae, that preserve the basic constitutional 
order while sharpening the contours of each stage in the interpretation 
process. This account should ring a bell, for its basic principles are 
variations on originalism, bright-line rules and deference. 
Originalism: there are both continuities and discontinuities 
between PO and American originalism. The former endorses the two 
basic tenets of the latter—that meaning is fixed, and that it constrains 
the interpreter.214 However, it takes a different form than the American 
                                               
 213 Anthony T. Kronman, Precedent and Tradition, 99 YALE L.J. 1029 (1990). 
But cf. Luban, supra note 180 (emphasizing the rationality of the common law as a 
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prototype, in two major ways. First, it applies originalist methodology 
to statutory rather than constitutional material (thus far). Second, it is 
closer to intentionalism, a strand that had ushered the conservative 
backlash in the U.S. but has since fallen out of fashion.215 Both aspects 
make good sense, from the perspective of conservative values, when 
applied to Israeli law. Statutory history is ostensibly a liberal element 
in the American context, as conservatives accord heavy weight to 
historical background only in constitutional interpretation. But the real 
difference is the objective of the interpretive process, whether an 
‘original’ (empirical) or an ‘evolving’ (normative) kind of thing.216 
Consider Scalia’s reasons for rejecting legislative intent: it is 
alien to traditional judicial practice;217 it is dubious that any detailed and 
cohesive intent can be genuinely assigned to a body such as 
Congress;218 it encourages legislators to manipulate interpretation by 
inserting discarded purposes into legislative protocols;219 and, most 
importantly, “under the guise or even the self-delusion of pursuing 
unexpressed legislative intents, common-law judges will in fact pursue 
                                               
text). A possible explanation for this gap may be that in the Jewish tradition, meaning 
is dynamic and religious texts constantly reinterpreted—so much so that the Talmud 
rather than the Bible is the central text for religious practice. By contrast, 
Protestantism views the biblical text, and by analogy the Constitution, as the 
beginning and end of all inquiry. 
 215 Even though intentionalism “has never entirely disappeared.” Solum, 
Originalism, supra note 186, at 1251; see also Whittington, Originalism, supra note 161, at 
382. 
 216 Whittington, Originalism, supra note 161, at 389; Scalia, Common-Law, supra 
note 153, at 16. An alternative taxonomy, offered by Israeli scholars Shahar Lifshitz 
and Elad Finkelstein, suggests assessing interpretive theories according to three axes: 
how independent the text is from its author’s intent; whether the method of inquiry 
is linguistic or purposivist; and the division of labor between author and interpreter. 
Shahar Lifshitz & Elad Finkelstein, A Hermeneutic Perspective on the Interpretation of 
Contracts, 54 AM. BUS. L.J. 519, 526–43 (2017). In these terms, PO can be 
characterized as an authorial-linguistic approach; PI a textual-purposivist one; and 
American originalism a textual-linguistic one. See Id. at 538–41. 
 217 Scalia, Common-Law, supra note 153, at 29–30. 
 218 Id. at 31–32. See also John F. Manning, Inside Congress’s Mind, 115 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1911 (2015); Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative 
Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239 (1992). I do not dwell on this point 
in comparing PI and PO because Barak and Sohlberg agree that legislative will exists 
and that it deserves some degree of consideration. 
 219 Scalia, Common-Law, supra note 153, at 34–36. 
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their own objectives and desires.”220 The counter-majoritarian 
difficulty is the fiercest common enemy of both Justice Sohlberg and 
American conservatism, wary of interpreting the law to mean “what it 
ought to mean.”221 Scalia’s weapon of choice was canons, coupled with 
historical material in constitutional cases; Sohlberg’s is legislative 
history. 
This choice is better suited for furthering a conservative 
jurisprudence in the Israeli context, as is choosing intent over public 
meaning, because the boundary between the constitutional and the 
statutory text is much blurrier. PO is on board with PI in treating 
statutory and constitutional texts as consecutive points on the same 
axis, as well as understanding subjective purpose to denote the 
legislature’s articulated goals rather than hidden thoughts.222 This 
inquiry thus requires no foray into extra-legislative sources, setting PO 
apart from currently prevailing originalist theories which look for 
Constitutional communicative content fixed to the time of its 
utterance.223 PO’s elevation of legislative history is not only due to the 
Basic Laws’ recency, vague normative status prior to 1995, and a matter 
of continuous contestation.224 It is also due to the fact that these laws 
are enacted in the regular course of parliamentary work: in the same 
physical institution; by the same people, even if acting under two 
distinct hats;225 and with the same procedure as regular statutes, 
including passing with no more than a simple majority—and the same 
goes for the amendment of most Basic Laws provisions. Israeli 
                                               
 220 Id. at 17–18. See also Scalia, Originalism, supra note 208, at 863. 
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110. 
 222 Gini II, supra note 62, ¶ 11 (Sohlberg, J., dissenting). Cf. Scalia, Common-
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Barak replies: “New textualism correctly points out that the legislature enacted the 
statute and not the intent. However, that does not mean that we cannot take the 
intent into consideration, in order to understand the statute.” BARAK, PURPOSIVE 
INTERPRETATION, supra note 25, at 280. 
 223 Solum, Fixation, supra note 173, at 6–9. 
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constitutional law did not constitute the legal order from scratch, but 
was added atop, or rather shoved beneath, a pre-existing one. Pursuant 
to these factors and most importantly, the conservative view in Israel 
is to downplay rather than elevate the cultural and legal stature of the 
Basic Laws.226 
Under these circumstances, Sohlberg’s reliance on legislative 
will best addresses the counter-majoritarian difficulty to conservative 
satisfaction. Scalia’s trade-off between the clarity the constitutional text 
lacks and the consensus it enjoys, would not work; in Israel, there is 
usually no difference in clarity of original meaning, and consensus 
favors legislation. Nor would strict reliance on canons work, because 
Barak’s schema already incorporates them and maximizes their 
potential for judicial liberation.227 Similarly to the beginning of 
American originalism, the only antidote perceived as strong enough 
against a powerful teleology is the will of the lawmaker, ensuring 
judicial objectivity, textual clarity, and public consensus, which reflect 
the actual practices of society.228 Justice Breyer contrasts originalism 
with his own approach that is “concerned with the conditions of 
life.”229 The question is whose life. Whereas Barak treated the author 
                                               
 226 One manifestation of this downplay is the high frequency of 
amendments to the Basic Laws, most of which are not entrenched. Thus, the right-
wing majority twentieth Knesset, which was in place in the years 2015–2019, 
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as dead230 and the constitution as living,231 Sohlberg takes steps toward 
resurrecting the author and killing the constitution.232 
Yet not all conditions of life are created equal.233 One way to 
explain PO’s resonance chiefly in state and religion cases is as a latent 
contestation over the human rights Basic Laws’ normative supremacy. 
The pieces of legislation Sohlberg defended reflect what is known as 
‘the status quo:’ the compromise reached between the Zionist 
leadership and the ultra-Orthodox one toward the establishment of 
Israel, facilitating mutual cooperation. ‘The status quo’ balances 
competing approaches to Judaism in the public sphere, providing 
exclusive jurisdiction to religious courts over marriage and divorce 
proceedings; recognizing the Jewish Sabbath as the official day of rest; 
promising public institutions will provide Kosher food; and ensuring 
autonomous educational systems to ultra-orthodox communities.234 
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Some scholars argue that the “status quo letter” sent from the states’ 
leaders to the religious ones, containing these details, is “a founding 
fathers agreement.”235 PO similarly seems to view the legal regimes 
grounded in this arrangement as a “small ‘c’ constitution,”236 not 
without reason. It does not enjoy lesser public consensus than the 
human rights Basic Laws and it played an actual role in Israeli nation-
building—it is more original, as a genuine chronological origin—despite 
not having any formal normative status, let alone superiority.237 Instead 
of using principles enshrined in the Basic Laws as interpretive devices, 
Sohlberg uses those of ‘the status quo’ agreement, at least when 
deciding cases involving the “Jewish and democratic” character of the 
state.238 As the statutes considered in PO cases also preceded the Basic 
Laws chronologically, PO thereby challenges the role of the savings 
clause precluding retroactive review. Currently, Israeli judges try, as 
Rivka Weill explains, “to minimize its anachronistic effects on society 
[ . . . the savings clause is] treated as a problematic, undesired, but 
necessary compromise tool.”239 But PO resembles the treatment of 
such clauses in countries “that glorify the past,” since it treats protected 
laws “as a benchmark for interpreting the constitution” rather than the 
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other way around.240 Yet it would be a mistake to think of the ‘the 
status quo’ as fixed in time. In fact, it is no less a dynamic framework 
than the Basic Laws, and the compromises it enshrines are in constant 
legal flux.241 In practice, the idealization of the status quo via the 
savings clause is therefore an active, socially sensitive judicial pursuit—
just like originalist interpretations of the U.S. Constitution.242 
Bright-Line Rules: that “liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence 
of doubt”243 means that to honor the law is to promote stability, 
predictability, and certainty. This quote originally referred to the 
conservative principle of stare decisis, yet the same holds true for the 
scope and specificity of the norms produced by stable, continuous 
adjudication. A strictly rule-bound decision-making stabilizes not only 
because standards open a space for ambiguity and hence indeterminacy 
and contestation, but also by obstructing fundamental challenges from 
receiving serious consideration: “Rules force the future into the 
categories of the past.”244 Moreover, formalist stability may disable 
reactionary jurisprudential movements from overstating their case in 
the form of a conservative counter-revolution.245 On top of that, in 
PO’s case, it may account for the way the chronological aspect of 
ultimate purpose construction is accommodated: social evolution 
needs to have reached a conclusive stage, such that no further public 
turmoil is expected. Both the social and the legal status quos deserve 
reverence. 
Indeed, Sohlberg explicitly endorses formalism, as did Scalia,246 
and claims it is currently lacking. “Now is the time for a moderate 
return to a more formal law,” per Sohlberg, because “formalism is 
necessary for jurists to navigate the labyrinth of the law [ . . . ] to walk 
safely, step by step. [ . . . ] purposive interpretation can sometimes leave 
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a space of vagueness, and its result is uncertainty.”247 And he kept true 
to his word in designing PO in practice. PI is very inclusive with 
respect to interpretive devices, offering a method of balancing and 
synthesizing them into an ultimate purpose: legislative history, plain 
meaning analysis, fundamental values, the legislature’s intent, canons 
of construction—all are welcome.248 Substituting this reliance on 
judicial discretion and open-ended standards with a rule-and-
exceptions model,249 and the Barakian normative framework with an 
empirical one,250 bright-line rules lead PO to clear and predictable 
resolutions to interpretive disputes. 
Deference: “The key word,” writes Justice Sohlberg in Association 
of Merchants, is “balance.”251 That is true for Barak as well, but for him 
balance denotes expert judges weighing legally protected rights and 
interests. For Sohlberg, by contrast, balance stands for democratic 
representatives reaching political compromises, which judges respect 
and validate. In said case, Sohlberg accepted the exclusion of 
entertainment venues from the prohibition to operate on the Sabbath, 
but not supermarkets, because this differentiation was a politically 
convenient status quo.252 The realization that legislative process is 
driven by political compromise led Scalia to deem legislative history 
                                               
 247 Noam Sohlberg, Keep the Law and Do Justice, 8 DIN UDVARIM 13, 18–19 
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impermissible, since judges are bound only by the purpose as and when 
it was given textual form.253 The very same reason and same vision of 
judge-legislator division of labor leads Sohlberg to invite legislative 
history in: the text is the end product, of both the legislative and the 
interpretive processes.254 Ending the empirical quest at the moment of 
enactment sets Sohlberg apart from liberals in both jurisdictions who 
view meaning as dynamic and evolving. It purports to express ultimate 
respect for the democratic representatives of the people. Sohlberg 
believes, like Scalia did regarding constitutional cases, that considering 
historical material only strengthens these commitments. 
Deference asks not what the meaning of a term is, but who 
gets to decide.255 Deference cements PO’s majoritarian view of 
democracy, in line with American conservatism. It does so by 
predicating political legitimacy on past generations’ consent and by 
putting hurdles in the way of non-legislative social progress, in a prima 
facie objective and neutral manner. 
Finally, deference may also contribute to understanding which 
are the cases that require PO’s treatment most acutely: those that deal 
with issues voters care deeply about, to the extent that they may play a 
role in their voting deliberations. Hence, they demand of the judge 
stringent adherence to representatives’ value judgments and rigorous 
engagement with original legislative intents. 
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                                 *** 
The combination of originalism, bright-line rules and 
deference makes good sense to judicial conservatives in Israel just as it 
did to American ones in the 1980s. The following reasons are provided 
by Justice Sohlberg for according conclusive weight to original intent 
as manifested in legislative history: 
“Common sense (because the creator of a norm is best 
positioned to testify as to its purpose); [ . . . ] separation 
of powers (since the legislative branch creates the law, 
and the judge’s role is to validate the legislature’s 
creation); [ . . . ] objectivity and neutrality of the judicial 
act (which is not guided by the judge’s subjective 
thoughts about proper policy, but rather by the view 
and the decision of the legislature); promotion of legal 
certainty and the ability to predict the interpretation of 
the norm (and hence equal operation of the law).”256 
These principles guiding the proposed interpretive reform are 
no less revealing than its methodological details, for they connote 
broader ideological ideals. If Barak asserts that the constitutional 
scheme authorizes the judge to give a statute the best possible meaning 
via interpretation, Sohlberg understands separation of powers as 
limiting judicial discretion to mere validation. This stands in sharp 
contrast to Barak’s view that “the judge is a junior partner in the 
legislative project,”257 but not the other way around. Sohlberg pulls the 
judge out of the legislative process and brings the legislature into the 
judicial one. Accordingly, where Barak grants the judge the capacity to 
extract objective principles underpinning the legal system, Sohlberg 
warns of “the subjective thoughts of the judge”—this casts doubt over 
the whole idea of “the system’s intent:” both intents are subjective, the 
question is only if we favor the legislature’s subjectivity or the 
judge’s.258 In Justice Sohlberg’s own words in Rom, “there is no 
advantage to the values we hold, as judges, over the values held by any 
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other person.”259 Lastly, Barak’s injection of constitutional rights like 
equality into the interpretive process, is reduced by Sohlberg to fair 
application of the legislature’s will, whatever its content.260 
PO puts an American conservative mirror in front of the 
liberal judicial mainstream. On the methodological front, it favors 
empirical over normative considerations, giving specific primacy to 
legislative history, because it searches for the original intent of the 
legislature. On the hermeneutic front, it views the meaning of the text 
as fixed to the time of its enactment. On the democratic front, it favors 
majoritarianism, which requires judicial deference and restraint via 
categorical rules and conclusiveness. On the epistemological front, it 
is skeptical about judges’ rationality, and possibly about human 
rationality at large. And on the policy front, it favors religious over 
other liberties and strives to preserve the social status quo, infused with 
a reasonable dose of idealization.261 Instead of “bridg[ing] the gap 
between law and the needs of society,”262 interpretation’s role is to keep 
things as they are. 
2. Between Law and Politics: Judicial Appointments 
While PI idealizes the judge and her interpretative endeavor 
(and hence is only nostalgic for the future), PO idealizes the 
representative and her legislative process as the best articulator of 
those values deeply rooted in the nation’s history.263 Its understanding 
of tradition maneuvers between conflicting commitments to preserve 
and to react: keep things steady and return them to the time before the 
revolution.264 In the political arena, the latter route is preferred. 
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Diligently pursuing a counter-revolution is Ayelet Shaked: a leading 
figure in a coalition of right-wing parties who served as Minister of 
Justice in the years 2015–2019. According to a 2018 profile, “even her 
fiercest detractors admit that she is the most effective player currently 
operating in Israel’s roiling political arena.”265 Her number one priority 
as Minister was judicial appointments.266 In filling judicial vacancies, 
Shaked’s goal was, in her own words, “to return the court to its 
paramount objective: interpreting the legislative branch’s norms rather 
than supplanting them”267 by appointing “conservative judges who will 
influence rulings according to their positions.”268 To oppose Barak’s 
legacy has generated political capital for prior ministers of justice and 
other politicians as well. Shaked’s statements are nonetheless telling, 
because they reveal a change in the right-wing view of governance as 
regards the judiciary. Not only did she seek to diversify the bench, 
claiming it is a closed clique of like-minded jurists who share similar 
backgrounds,269 nor were her misgivings of a strictly jurisprudential 
                                               
revolution (Kedar, supra note 24); the human rights revolution (ASSAF MEYDANI, THE 
ISRAELI SUPREME COURT AND THE HUMAN RIGHTS REVOLUTION: COURTS AS 
AGENDA SETTERS (2011)). 
 265 Yonit Levi, The Woman Who Could Be Israel’s Next Leader, ATLANTIC (Oct. 
9, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/10/netanyahu-
challenger-ayelet-shaked/572320. Shaked was also ranked first on the leading 
economic magazine TheMarker’s list of the most influential people in Israel for 2018. 
Ido Baum, 100 Most Influential 2018, #1 Ayelet Shaked: Minister of Justice, THEMARKER 
(2018), https://www.themarker.com/EXT-INTERACTIVE-1.6430642 [Hebrew]. 
 266 Omri Assenheim, Game of Thrones, UVDA, Nov. 22, 2017, available at 
http://www.mako.co.il/tv-ilana_dayan/2017/Article-8a19b6c5884ef51006.htm 
[Hebrew]. 
 267 Tova Tzimuki, Two New Justices Selected for Supreme Court, YNET (Feb. 22, 
2018), https://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-5126945,00.html; see also 
Jonathan Tepperman, Ministering Justice: A Conversation with Ayelet Shaked, 95 FOREIGN 
AFF. 2, 5 (2016). 
 268 Tal Schneider, “Shaked: ‘These Elections are a Challenge for the Right. I will 
Probably Run,’” GLOBES (June 16, 2019), 
https://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1001289769 [Hebrew]. 
 269 An empirical study on the social composition of the Israeli judiciary 
found that various minorities are indeed under-represented among judges, but one 
minority that is over-represented is religious Zionism. Alon Jasper, A Place at the 
Table: On the Social Composition of the Israeli Judiciary 46–52, 80–82 (Sept., 2018) 
(unpublished LL.M. thesis, Tel Aviv University) (on file with author) [Hebrew]. 
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nature or driven by personal animosity.270 Rather, she framed her 
desirable judiciary in blunt political terms, taking pride in putting “on 
the table” the possibility of engaging in a debate between liberal and 
conservative judges, like the one raging in the U.S.271 More than a call 
for judges to exercise restraint and stay out of the political game, her 
conservative agenda seeks to substitute one ideological elite with 
another; institute a new hegemony on the ruins of a former one.272 The 
idea of social hierarchy is not rejected, only different people are put at 
the top. And the tool for their ascent is interpretive methodology. 
This is significant because judges have no political affiliation in 
Israel. The judicial appointment process is far less political than the 
American one,273 done by a committee comprising representatives of 
all branches of government as well as the Bar.274 True, the Court’s 
growing involvement in political questions since the 1980s, primarily 
due to the practical erosion of the justiciability and standing 
doctrines,275 has resulted in political attempts to curtail its 
independence and arguably in a decline of public trust.276 This includes 
the appointment process becoming, since the 1990s, a matter of 
controversy that draws attention to the social identities of the selected 
judges,277 and increasingly so in recent years.278 Still, judges are generally 
                                               
 270 Jurisprudential and personal differences characterize the attitude of 
former Minister of Justice, Professor Daniel Friedmann, to the Barak Court. 
Ginsburg, supra note 22; MENACHEM MAUTNER, LAW AND THE CULTURE OF 
ISRAEL 167 (2011). Friedmann attempted during his tenure (2007–2009) to 
implement various agendas promoted by conservative intellectual circles, with 
limited success. Id. at 170. 
 271 Schneider, supra note 268. 
 272 See Maya Mark, Justice, Justice Shall You Pursue, 2 TELEM 20, 22 (2019), 
available at https://telem.berl.org.il/394/ [Hebrew]. See also, on the demise of the 
liberal hegemony in Israel, infra notes 400–406 and accompanying text. 
 273 Supra notes 160–162 and accompanying text. 
 274 See NAVOT 2007, supra note 65, at 146. 
 275 See Elad Gil, Judicial Answer to Political Question: The Political Question Doctrine 
in the United States and Israel, 23 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 245 (2014). See also supra note 58. 
 276 Id. at 275–76; MAUTNER, LAW AND THE CULTURE OF ISRAEL, supra note 
270, at 169. 
 277 Jasper, supra note 269, at 48–52; FRIEDMANN, supra note 11, at 317. 
 278 See Lahav Harkov, Sex, Judges and Politics: Will Latest Scandal Hurt Shaked?, 
JERUSALEM POST (Jan. 16, 2019), https://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Sex-judges-
and-politics-Will-latest-scandal-hurt-Shaked-577647; Revital Hovel, Israeli Judicial 
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not considered partisan figures, including by proxy of appointer; the 
Court is generally guided by a uniform professional ethos; it enjoys 
higher rates of public trust than most state institutions;279 and the 
judicial branch has actively taken various institutional steps to distance 
itself from the political arena.280 The current move, by contrast, marks 
judges being appointed as belonging to one of two opposed ideological 
camps, which correlate with the ones on the political map, and 
interpretation is the litmus test. Finally, what is striking about Shaked’s 
campaign is that unlike previous attacks on the Supreme Court, it was 
successful. 
Reminiscent of the Reagan administration in setting judicial 
appointments as the top of the agenda, communicating it to the public 
as a matter of political urgency, Shaked diligently scrutinized potential 
nominees to ascertain their world-views.281 She was fortunate to have 
six out of fifteen Supreme Court Justices retire during her tenure,282 
and therefore presided over the selections of over a third of the current 
composition of Court, cementing a lasting impact. The new Justices 
have not defied expectations, penning opinions on stricter standing 
                                               
Committee Member Plays Ethnic Card, HAARETZ (Aug. 15, 2015), 
https://www.haaretz.com/judicial-c-tee-member-plays-ethnic-card-1.5386998. 
 279 TAMAR HERMANN ET AL., THE ISRAELI DEMOCRACY INDEX 2019: 
SELECT FINDINGS 4 (2020), https://en.idi.org.il/media/13847/summary-the-israeli-
democracy-index-2019-en.pdf; Shinar, Accidental Constitutionalism, supra note 19, at 
227–29. 
 280 See Jasper, supra note 269, at 19–24. 
 281 Assenheim, supra note 266; Nahum Barnea & Tova Tzimuki, “During My 
Tenure Democracy has Gotten Stronger,” YEDIOTH AHRONOTH (Weekend Supplement, 
Sept. 6, 2018), https://www.yediot.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-5342457,00.html 
[Hebrew]. Accordingly, Shaked has vetoed the promotion to the Supreme Court of 
a celebrated district court judge, whose husband had been associated with a civil 
rights NGO, on “political-ideological” grounds (words of Efi Nave, former Head of 
the Israeli Bar Association who sat with Shaked on the judicial nominations 
committee. Assenheim, supra). 
 282 The statutory retirement age for Judges in Israel, in all instances, is 70. 
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rights;283 increased deference to the executive;284 non-interference in 
religious courts’ rulings, no matter their infringement on rights;285 overt 
skepticism regarding the competence and efficiency of various 
bureaucratic structures;286 non-justiciability of foreign relations, 
invoking the American political question doctrine;287 harsh sentencing 
                                               
 283 LPA-App 8411/16 Sela v. Israel Prison Service (July 17, 2018), ¶¶ 15–25 
(Mintz, J., dissenting), available at 
https://supremedecisions.court.gov.il/Home/Download?path=HebrewVerdicts\1
6\110\084\n15&fileName=16084110.N15&type=4 [Hebrew]. 
 284 CA 7488/16 Seligman v. Phoenix Insurance Company Ltd. (May 31, 
2018), ¶ 40 (Willner, J.), available at 
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6\880\074\r18&fileName=16074880.R18&type=4 [Hebrew] (ruling that when a 
regulator’s interpretation of its own rules is reasonable, “the default would be to 
adopt this position”) (a further hearing of the case by an extended panel has been 
ordered, CFH 4960/18, and is currently pending; last checked May 26, 2020). In a 
later decision, Justice Willner explicitly framed this reasoning as Chevron deference, HCJ 
2875/18 Association of Foreign Manpower in Construction Corporations v. 
Government of Israel (June 18, 2019), ¶¶ 27–28 (Willner, J.), available at 
https://supremedecisions.court.gov.il/Home/Download?path=HebrewVerdicts\1
8\750\028\r10&fileName=18028750.R10&type=4 [Hebrew]. For conservative 
justifications of Chevron, see Young, Judicial Activism, supra note 127, at 1199; 
Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 
511. 
 285 HCJ 4602/13 Jane Doe v. Regional Rabbinic Court Haifa (Nov. 18, 
2018), ¶ 1 (Stein, J.), available at 
https://supremedecisions.court.gov.il/Home/Download?path=HebrewVerdicts\1
3\020\046\e13&fileName=13046020.E13&type=4 [Hebrew]; see also Yehuda 
Yifrach, Israeli Ninja: The Refreshing Audacity of Justice Stein, MAKOR RISHON (Nov. 24, 
2018), https://www.makorrishon.co.il/opinion/94181/ [Hebrew]. 
 286 AAA 6525/17 Sanlakol Ltd. v. Jezreel Valley Regional Council (Nov. 8, 
2018), ¶¶ 18–25, 32 (Stein, J.), available at 
https://supremedecisions.court.gov.il/Home/Download?path=HebrewVerdicts\1
7\250\065\f08&fileName=17065250.F08&type=4 [Hebrew]; CApp 5894/18 




 287 HCJ 8542/18 Ackerman v. Government of Israel (Dec. 9, 2018), available 
at 
https://supremedecisions.court.gov.il/Home/Download?path=HebrewVerdicts\1
8\420\085\f01&fileName=18085420.F01&type=4 [Hebrew]; a summary of the 
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resting on an over-emphasis on general deterrence;288 and even 
lowering the standards for granting the necessity defense to anti-
terrorism interrogators, in a decision some claim amounts to 
legitimation of torture.289 As Shaked put it, “the entire right-wing, and 
certainly religious Zionism and the whole conservative camp, can no 
longer complain about being underrepresented.”290 
A Shaked appointee who joined the Court in 2018 and merits 
special attention is Justice Alex Stein. A law professor who had left 
Israel in 2004 for an academic career in the U.S., yet continued to 
produce right-of-center commentary on Israeli affairs,291 he was sought 
after by Shaked’s aides thanks to his reputation as a conservative 
jurist.292 It was not long before the American interpretive debate 
resurfaced, when Justice Stein favorably invoked textualism in a 2019 
concurrence. Citing Scalia and Garner,293 Stein advocated an approach 
that “looks for the meaning of the legislated edict as a matter of 
empirical fact [ . . . ] only when the language is unclear should the 
interpreter consider the purpose of the statute and the legislative 
                                               
 288 CrimA 4802/18 John Doe v. State of Israel (Jan. 29, 2019), ¶¶ 34–35 
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 292 Ido Baum & Bini Aschkenasy, Ayelet Shaked’s Man for Special Operations 
Reveals: This is How We Appointed Judges, THEMARKER (July 19, 2019), 
https://www.themarker.com/law/.premium-1.7539383 [Hebrew]. 
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history.”294 Additionally, he opined that at least some specific types of 
texts, presidential clemency decisions, must be interpreted according 
to their original public meaning, citing American originalists like 
Professor Solum. Justice Stein thereby referred to the concept of 
objective purpose with overt skepticism, denying its relevance 
altogether when dealing with such texts.295 Indeed, in a case of statutory 
interpretation, Stein ignored the concept of purpose altogether, 
examining solely language and intent. Asking whether an anti-
discrimination mandate on private parties who provide a “product” 
applies to apartment renting, Stein reached the radical conclusion that 
such an interpretation would “cross the boundaries of the language.”296 
In ordinary language use, he reasoned, “product” refers only to 
personal rather than real property; and the legislative history, which 
Stein seems to deem informative of the semantic meaning itself, 
suggests that lawmakers intended to exclude real property from the 
statute’s scope.297 
Justice Stein supported his approach with reasons very similar 
to the ones Justice Sohlberg listed,298 but he has yet to develop an 
elaborate interpretive argument. Still, in assessing the growing 
influence of American conservative jurisprudence over Israel, this is a 
pivotal addition to PO. It seems that the combination of PO with 
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Minister Shaked’s campaign has opened the floodgates of interpretive 
contestation.299 While Stein is more akin to American conservative 
judges in being unapologetic, at times scathing, Sohlberg is more 
conservative.300 For he favors an incremental, moderate approach rather 
than a counter-revolution. A lecture delivered shortly after he was 
appointed to the Supreme Court is titled “Keep the Law”301—to honor 
is also to preserve, and purism, methodological or otherwise, is in 
tension with safeguarding a state of affairs just by virtue of its pre-
existence.302 
“For the first time,” states a prominent cause lawyer, “we have 
stopped evaluating judges professionally and analyzing them with legal 
tools, and have started evaluating them according to their world-
view.”303 Conservatism is a judicial force to be reckoned with. It is only 
natural that Justice Sohlberg is its torchbearer. Set to become the 
Court’s president in 2028,304 an expectation that he would lead the way 
to a conservative jurisprudence had already been present in relevant 
political circles.305 This is but one reason why PO would be difficult to 
dissociate from conservative political ideology. Another one is that 
although Justice Sohlberg was appointed to the Supreme Court in the 
                                               
 299 See also supra note 284, infra note 422 and accompanying text. 
 300 Sohlberg identified himself as a conservative thus: “I plead guilty to this 
label attached to me [ . . . ] conservatism is quite a natural thing in the world of law [ 
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same year Shaked entered national politics, 2012,306 it is only after she 
had assumed the role of Minister of Justice that PO emerged. 
Furthermore, Justice Sohlberg identified himself with the political 
Right in 2017. The President of the Court had decided that no 
representative of the judicial branch would attend a ceremony 
commemorating fifty years of Israeli control over, and settlement in, 
the West Bank, due to the politically controversial nature of the event. 
Sohlberg, a settler, attended nonetheless “as a private citizen.”307 His 
setting himself outside of judicial mainstream echoes in PO as well. He 
expressed dry irony in Association of Merchants, writing: “we will not 
paint [the disagreement] in stark colors; this is not ‘religious’ versus 
‘secular’, not ‘north’ versus ‘south’ nor the periphery versus ‘the state 
of Tel-Aviv.’”308 The very inclusion of this sentence in the opinion 
conveys the opposite message of the plain text, planting doubts in the 
reader’s mind regarding the other Justices’ biases. The most plausible 
audience for this message is the layperson, with whom PO seeks to 
communicate directly, as Scalia’s textualism does.309 Specifically, the 
one who resides in the heartland and desires recognition of his 
remoteness from the concentrated elite. 
3. As Political Ideology 
a.   Constructing a Conservative Identity 
No political figure emblemizes the emerging Israeli 
conservatism better than the same Ayelet Shaked. Not only because of 
                                               
 306 Ayelet Shaked ran her first primaries campaign in 2012, and was sworn 
as MK in January 2013. 
 307 Chen Maanit, What Happens When a Supreme Court Justice Suddenly “Turns 
into” a Private Person, GLOBES (Oct. 3, 2017), 
https://www.globes.co.il/news/article.aspx?did=1001207141 [Hebrew]. 
 308 Association of Merchants, supra note 71, ¶ 37 (Sohlberg, J., dissenting). 
“The State of Tel-Aviv” is a familiar trope denoting an ostensible gap between the 
liberal city and the rest of the country. Similarly, the city’s residents are often depicted 
as “sushi eaters,” and Sohlberg alludes to this as well when he imagines why Tel-
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could buy “milk and eggs and soy sauce.” Id. ¶ 31 (Sohlberg, J., dissenting). 
 309 Supra note 167 and accompanying text. 
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her political stature and the bright future predicted to her,310 but also 
because she has published a “manifesto” laying down her governance 
world-view.311 It is a perfect illustration of how Israeli conservatism 
has embraced all the major tenets of American conservatism, inner 
contradictions included, and is trying to consolidate them into a whole 
bigger than the sum of its parts, within the Israeli context. The text has 
three foci: legislation; the judiciary; and the definition of Israel as a 
Jewish and democratic state. 
Any legislative act, Shaked holds, is in and of itself an 
infringement on people’s liberty: “every time the legislature chooses to 
express confidence in a new normative mechanism [ . . . it] is a vote of 
no confidence in our ability as individuals and communities to conduct 
ourselves well enough without the state determining the course of our 
lives [ . . . ] a vote of no confidence in the power of families.”312 This 
approach echoes, on the one hand, the neo-liberal, economic 
conservatism of self-governance by isolated individuals rather than 
central state authorities, equating deregulation with promotion of 
freedom; and, on the other hand, the social conservative emphasis on 
time-honored institutions superior to the state, particularly the family. 
The link between the two kinds of conservatism is strengthened when 
Shaked quotes Milton Friedman, who framed the Jewish tradition as 
one of self-reliance, leading Shaked to conclude that “the values of 
freedom”—as Friedman understood them—”were the hallmark of our 
people during two thousand years of exile.”313 The result is a call for 
significant reduction in the number of laws passed by the Knesset, in 
order to let the free market roam. Incidentally, the raison d’être of 
Israel—whose national ethos was originally of a collectivist, socialist 
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mold314—is reimagined as one of a night-watchman state. Upon 
establishment of sovereignty, so Shaked’s story goes, the collective 
delegated its self-reliance values to the communities, families and 
individuals therein.315 
Moving to the judiciary, Shaked exhibits a heavily 
Americanized understanding of separation of powers. Describing it as 
a “power struggle,” she quotes Alexander Hamilton on the Court not 
holding the sword or the purse,316 thus portraying it as a constraint on 
both the economy and national security. Here the substantive 
conservatisms are joined by an institutional one: similarly to Sohlberg, 
Shaked speaks of “preventing future collisions” by way of judicial 
deference to the other branches. For her, judicial review is nothing 
more than policy making by unelected judges, irrespective of the legal 
standards that govern it. In contrast to the Federalist Papers, Shaked 
takes no notice of the possibility of a law superior to legislation, 
                                               
 314 The Israeli national ethos has been undergoing a process of increasing 
neo-liberalization since the 1980s. See, e.g., Ran Hirschl, Israel’s ‘Constitutional 
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whether establishing checks and balances or a bill of rights.317 The only 
exception is the Jewish nature of the state.318 
Israel as a Jewish and Democratic state is the third topic of the 
article. Again, Shaked turns to American inspiration: Thomas Jefferson 
and Abraham Lincoln as well as John Locke.319 Shaked stipulates that 
these figures’ views on democracy actually stemmed from the Jewish 
tradition, which had introduced “the model of separation of powers 
thousands of years ago.”320 Ergo, enhancing the state’s Jewish 
character will automatically promote its democratic one. Democracy is 
not only an outcome of Jewish tradition, but specifically one which 
holds that “nothing is more just or correct than the decision of the 
people and its representatives.” Judicial restraint is nothing short of a 
rabbinic imperative.321 This view is contrasted with that of Barak’s, 
who “effectively turned the concept of a Jewish state into something 
symbolic, a concept that exists only insofar as it is completely 
consistent with the values of ‘democracy’—and a very specific version 
of democracy at that.”322 Not only “very specific,” but inferior, because 
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it did not genuinely incorporate the Jewish elements which make it a 
better one. 
For this former Minister of Justice, judicial activism means that 
“the demos has been turned into a demon.”323 The American Right is 
similarly reluctant to grant institutional authority to interpret the 
abstract values enshrined in the constitution. For it amounts to a “rule 
by judges,” which should be resisted because “[t]he tradition of this 
political community cannot accept the proposition that the elite make 
better decisions than the people.”324 Shaked is not alone in wedding a 
“schoolyard rivalry” version of separation of powers325—yet without 
constitutional protections, advocating an unchecked majority rule—
with the three conservative political strands: social, economic, and 
national security. Following a broader assimilation of American culture 
and values regardless of political ideology,326 the Israeli Right has been 
increasingly borrowing various strategies and policies of Republican 
politics, bringing right-wing closer to becoming synonymous with 
conservatism of the American kind (even adopting the title “a 
Republican party”327). Before exploring specific instances in sections 
III.B.3.b–c below, it is important to consider the social backdrop for 
                                               
 323 Moshe Gorali, Supreme Court President Hayut: “Governance Is Not a Permit to 
Break the Law;” Shaked: “The Demos has Been Turned into a Demon,” CALCALIST (Dec. 
21, 2017), https://www.calcalist.co.il/local/articles/0,7340,L-3727939,00.html 
[Hebrew]. 
 324 Michael W. McConnell, The Role of Democratic Politics in Transforming Moral 
Convictions into Law, 98 YALE L.J. 1501, 1538 (1989). 
 325 In the words of the President of the International Criminal Court, Judge 
Chile Eboe-Osuji. Prosecutor v. Ruto, ICC-01/09-01/11, Decision on Defence 
Applications for Judgments of Acquittal, ¶ 385 (Eboe-Osuji, J.) (Apr. 5, 2016), 
available at https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2016_04384.PDF. 
 326 Cohn, supra note 20, at 23–24; Myron J. Aronoff, The “Americanization” of 
Israeli Politics: Political and Cultural Change, 5 ISR. STUD. 92 (2000); Uri Ram, Citizens, 
Consumers and Believers: The Israeli Public Sphere between Capitalism and Fundamentalism, 3 
ISR. STUD. 24 (1998). 
 327 Time of Israel Staff, Pleading for Right-Wing Unity, Shaked Backs Off Key 
Demand in Merger Talks, TIMES OF ISRAEL (July 25, 2019), 
https://www.timesofisrael.com/pleading-for-right-wing-unity-shaked-backs-off-
demand-in-merger-talks/ (“Establishing a right bloc is an urgent matter, a kind of 
large republican party”). 
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the emerging Israeli conservative movement, as a joint endeavor of 
political and civil society forces. 
After being dominated for decades by liberal motivations, the 
map of civil society organizations and cause lawyering has changed: 
“the Right has studied the methods of the Left. The civil arena is 
important and must be played in. That is why in recent years right-wing 
NGOs and think-tanks have emerged.”328 Many of them are funded by 
American money, promote conservative ideas, and put legal issues at 
the top of their agendas. A noteworthy organization is the American 
fund Tikvah, which promotes a conservative agenda through multiple 
avenues.329 Among the projects that Tikvah funds is the Hashiloach 
magazine, which facilitates various intellectual efforts at reconciling the 
Jewish tradition with Anglo-American conservative thought, including 
Shaked’s treatise discussed above,330 as well as the only text published 
by Justice Sohlberg for a wide, non-lawyer audience.331 Other projects 
that have been financially supported by the fund include different 
academic programs and seminars for students, scholars, and policy-
makers;332 a college built on the American liberal arts model, that 
                                               
 328 Barnea & Tzimuki, supra note 281 (quoting former minister Ayelet 
Shaked). 
 329 Tikvah describes its philosophy thus: “In its political philosophy, the 
Fund is Zionist. Economically, it supports the free market. Culturally, it tends 
towards the traditional. In civilian and religious matters, it supports individual 
freedom.” HASHILOACH, About https://hashiloach.org.il/about (last visited May 26, 
2020). Full disclosure: the Tikvah fund contributed to a scholarship received by the 
author as an undergraduate student at Tel Aviv University. 
 330 Supra note 311; see also Yoav Sorek, A Question of Identity, 14 HASHILOACH 
43 (2019), available at https://hashiloach.org.il/wp-
content/uploads/2019/05/hashiloach-14-full-print.pdf [Hebrew]; Benjamin 
Schvarcz, To Speak Correctly about Democracy, 7 HASHILOACH 75 (2017), available at 
https://hashiloach.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/2-2-hashiloach_7-
shcwartz-web.pdf [Hebrew]; Nir Barkat, Nine Measures of Free Hand, 4 HASHILOACH 
49 (2017), available at https://hashiloach.org.il/wp-
content/uploads/2017/05/hashiloach-4-ewb-1-barkat.pdf [Hebrew]. 
 331 Sohlberg, On Subjective Values, supra note 63. 
 332 See Guy Liberman, A Fund from the Right, YEDIOTH AHRONOTH 
(Weekend Supplement, Jan. 18, 2018), https://www.yediot.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-
5073031,00.html [Hebrew]; Aviad Houminer, Religious Zionism: From Equality and 
Social Justice to Ultra-Capitalism, 77 DEOT (Dec. 2016–Jan. 2017), available at 
https://bit.ly/2Bh8NUI [Hebrew]. 
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centers on Jewish themes and sets as its purpose “to create visionary 
leaders for the Jewish state and the Jewish people,”333 as well as 
publishes translations into Hebrew of prominent conservative thinkers 
including Edmund Burke, Friedrich Hayek, and Leo Strauss;334 a 
separate publishing house for contemporary non-fiction books that 
appeals to “an elite in construction” and aims at furthering “the 
intellectual revolution of the conservative right-wing;”335 a website that 
publishes op-eds and news from classical liberal or libertarian 
perspectives drawing on Republican policies;336 a legal forum expressly 
inspired by The Federalist Society;337 and, most consequentially, the 
think-tank Kohelet. Kohelet issues policy papers, lobbies lawmakers, 
petitions the courts and submits amicus briefs, all advocating 
conservative policies in various spheres like the economy, international 
relations, immigration policy, and institutional design.338 This think-
tank also provides scholarships for Israelis to obtain an LL.M. degree 
from the Antonin Scalia Law School of George Mayson University, 
                                               
 333 Talila Nesher, Supported by Saar, Shalem Center Gains Academic Recognition, 
HAARETZ (Jan. 3, 2013), https://www.haaretz.co.il/news/education/1.1899517 
[Hebrew]. The college evolved from “an American style conservative think-tank.” 
Jonathan Rynhold, In Search of Israeli Conservatism, 7 J. POL. IDEOLOGIES 199, 204 
(2002). 
 334 The full catalogue is available at SHALEM PRESS, 
https://shalempress.co.il/ (last visited May 26, 2020). 
 335 Shibolet Press, About, FACEBOOK (OCT. 29, 2019), 
https://www.facebook.com/shiboletpress/about/ [Hebrew]. 
 336 See http://mida.org.il (last visited May 26, 2020) (the website’s name, 
Mida, means both virtue and measure—two conservative values). For examples of 
articles published on this website, see infra notes 350, 361. On its sources of funding, 
see Hilo Glazer, Ethics and Politics According to Baratz, HAARETZ (May 9, 2018), 
https://www.haaretz.co.il/magazine/.premium-MAGAZINE-1.6072595 
[Hebrew]. 
 337 See LEGAL FORUM FOR LAW AND LIBERTY, https://lawforum.org.il/ 
(last visited May 26, 2020). 
 338 See KOHELET POLICY FORUM, Policy Papers, 
https://en.kohelet.org.il/policy-papers (last visited May 26, 2020). For an example 
of an amicus brief, see HCJ 8665/14 Desta v. Knesset (Aug. 11, 2015), ¶ 18 (Naor, 
President), available at 
https://supremedecisions.court.gov.il/Home/Download?path=HebrewVerdicts\1
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known for its conservative orientation.339 Described as “one of the 
most powerful and influential bodies in Israeli politics,”340 Kohelet’s 
chief economic director served as one of Minister Shaked’s advisors,341 
as did the head of another think-tank whose self-explanatory name is 
The Ayn Rand Center.342 
These and other efforts of similar veins help facilitate 
conservatism as the go-to theory of the right-wing in Israel, which has 
not always been the case. The equation of liberalism with the left-wing 
is a recent paradigmatic shift,343 and the themes of conservatism have 
not been traditionally dominant in Israeli politics in a unified form.344 
The explanation provided by political science literature is that the 
different parties define themselves primarily by their stance toward 
Zionism, nationalism, and the Israeli-Arab conflict. This causes 
                                               
 339 Kohelet, The George Mayson LL.M. Program, https://bit.ly/2XBUx53 
[Hebrew] (last visited May 26, 2020). On the law school’s political orientation, see 
STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT: THE 
BATTLE FOR CONTROL OF THE LAW 182–83, 205–19 (2008). 
 340 Shuki Sade, 100 Most Influential 2018, #7 Meir Rubin: CEO of Kohelet Forum, 
THEMARKER (2018), https://www.themarker.com/EXT-INTERACTIVE-
1.6430761 [Hebrew]. See also Rami Hod & Yonatan Levi, How Conservative American 
Money Helped the Religious Right Take Over Israel, HAARETZ (Sept. 21, 2019), 
https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/elections/.premium.MAGAZINE-how-
conservative-american-money-helped-the-religious-right-take-over-israel-1.7846235 
(“Kohelet’s people are involved in virtually every significant legislative reform 
enacted by Netanyahu’s government [ . . . ] Their approach—which sanctifies the 
settlements on the one hand, and wild, unfettered markets on the other—has become 
bon ton in government circles”). 
 341 Baum, supra note 265. 
 342 Id.; see AYN RAND CENTER ISRAEL, About Us, 
https://www.aynrand.org.il/aboutus (last visited May 26, 2020). 
 343 For example, Ayelet Shaked posted to her Facebook page an excerpt 
from an interview with a former Minister of Justice from the major right-wing party 
Likud, Dan Meridor. He described his ideology as liberal, adding that for this reason 
he had never wanted to appoint conservative judges: “today the struggle is over issues 
that in the past were not under dispute.” Shaked’s caption for the excerpt was: “this 
is why you always voted for the Right but ended up with the Left.” Ayelet Shaked, 
FACEBOOK (Feb. 3, 2019) 
https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=2428987820487367. See also, Mark, supra 
note 272. 
 344 Guy Ben-Porat & Fany Yuval, Israeli Neo-Conservatism: Rise and Fall?, 22 
ISR. STUD. F. 3, 8 (2007); Rynhold, supra note 333, at 199. 
2020 Rise of American Conservatism in Israel 8:2 
455 
internal divisions within the right-wing, putting each of its strands at 
odds with at least one of the tenets of conservatism.345 
However, a devout and persistent proponent of American 
conservatism has been operating in the Israeli political arena for several 
decades: Prime Minister Netanyahu, “an Israeli Republican.”346 
Netanyahu has been promoting neo-liberal economic policies as tied 
to national freedom and might; holding a hawkish-pragmatic ideology 
while employing a friend v. foe rhetoric with regard to Arabs, including 
those who are Israeli citizens; appealing to voters’ sense of personal 
and national victimhood and existential struggle against universalistic 
progressive forces; encouraging a conservative intelligentsia; and has 
“repeatedly stated his preference for the presidential system, where the 
balance of power is tilted toward the executive branch.”347 Netanyahu 
is at home with the American right-wing, and has accordingly turned 
for support to “Christian fundamentalists and shrill right-wing Jewish 
groups” rather than the established institutions of American Jewish 
communities.348 His “lifelong goal” is to replace “Israel’s traditional 
elite with one more in tune with his philosophy.”349 
                                               
 345 Rynhold, supra note 333, at 211–16. 
 346 Marc Caputo, “Netanyahu is Essentially an Israeli Republican,” POLITICO 
(Aug. 15, 2019), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/08/15/israel-trump-
netanyahu-1465917. 
 347 DANI FILC, THE POLITICAL RIGHT IN ISRAEL: DIFFERENT FACES OF 
JEWISH POPULISM 55–78 (2009); see also Arie Krampf, Israel’s Neoliberal Turn and Its 
National Security Paradigm, 47 POLISH POL. SCI. Y.B. 227, 228 (2018); Gayil Talshir, 
Populist Rightwing Ideological Exposition: Netanyahu’s Regime as a Case in Point, 8 
ADVANCES APPLIED PSYCHOL. 329 (2018), available at 
https://file.scirp.org/pdf/AASoci_2018042415054624.pdf; Ben-Porat & Yuval, 
supra note 344; Rynhold, supra note 333, at 203–04, 214. On the link between 
conservatism and perceived victimhood, see supra note 184. 
 348 Jonathan Broder, Netanyahu and American Jews, 15 WORLD POL’Y J. 89, 90 
(1998). 
 349 Aluf Benn, The End of Old Israel, 95 FOREIGN. AFF. 16 (2016). In 
Netanyahu’s own words: “Israel is undergoing adjustment pains as it moves from 
adolescence to maturity. If initially its governing socialist class wanted to straight-
jacket all Israelis into one European socialist prototype, they have had a hard time 
accepting the fact that this will not happen.” BENJAMIN NETANYAHU, A DURABLE 
PEACE: ISRAEL AND ITS PLACE AMONG THE NATIONS xvii (rev. ed. 2000). 
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Netanyahu’s vision is now materializing, although his own 
political future is unclear. One manifestation of this success is the 
abundant use of the terms conservatism or neo-conservatism to 
identify currently rising political and intellectual right-wing forces.350 
As a label of political identity, conservatism began its ascendance with 
that of Netanyahu in the 1990s, and found the current historical 
moment ripe for gaining prominence. Through a younger generation 
of political leadership, Netanyahu’s “long-deferred dream of remaking 
Israel’s establishment” is coming to fruition.351 It was the year 2019 
that marks the first major public conference dedicated to “Israeli 
Conservatism.”352 
The term “Israeli conservatism” makes clear that the 
comparison must be qualified, in the light of the Jewish character of 
Israel, the revolutionary and socialist character of Zionism,353 and other 
                                               
 350 See, e.g., Tomer Persico, The Right is the New Left: Notes on the Current Political 
Moment, SHALOM HARTMAN INSTITUTE (Nov. 26, 2017), available at 
https://heb.hartman.org.il/Research_And_Comment_View.asp?Article_Id=1379 
[Hebrew]; Eric Cohen, Jewish Conservatism: A Manifesto, COMMENTARY (Apr. 2017), 
https://www.commentarymagazine.com/articles/jewish-conservatism-manifesto; 
Yehuda Vizan, Not Conservatives! Republicans: On the New Hashiloach, 8 DHAK 620 
(2017), available at 
http://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/47130e_52dd9b257726479dbde4ca1011bb825f.pdf 
[Hebrew]; Akiva Bigman, Is Religious Zionism Conservative?, MIDA (June 4, 2015), 
https://en.mida.org.il/2015/06/04/is-religious-zionism-conservative; Dror Eidar, 
The Mother of All Disengagements: On the Repression of the Metaphysical in Israeli Cultural 
Discourse, 21 AKDAMOT 52, 64 (2008), available at 
https://www.bmj.org.il/userfiles/akdamot/21/Eider.pdf [Hebrew]; Simcha 
Rothman, Seeds of Change: Surprise HCJ Conservative Ruling, MIDA (June 21, 2018), 
https://bit.ly/2wKOG1t [Hebrew]; Shmuel Rosner, How Israel Got Its Supreme Court 
Right, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/09/opinion/how-israel-got-its-supreme-
court-right.html?mcubz=0; Joshua Segev, Justifying Judicial Review: The Changing 
Methodology of the Israeli Supreme Court, in ISRAELI CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE 
MAKING, supra note 8, at 105, 118–20. 
 351 Benn, supra note 349, at 22; see also Ben-Porat & Yuval, supra note 344, at 
10. 
 352 THE ISRAELI CONSERVATISM CONFERENCE, https://con-
servative.com/en (last visited May 26, 2020). 
 353 Perhaps taking after the conservative view of the American Revolution 
as one “not made, but prevented” (O’Neill, supra note 139, at 305), the new Israeli 
conservatism depicts the Zionist movement as dedicated to keep things as they are 
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variations in culture, history, demographics, political structures, etc. 
One major hurdle, however, has been sidestepped by Netanyahu: the 
national conflict. Once the occupation of the West Bank354 is 
routinized and “managed”355—i.e. deadlock in the peace process 
becomes the desirable status quo—this conflict is no longer 
experienced as existential. Internal social issues consequently come to 
the fore, and there is room for an all-encompassing civil ideology to 
crystalize into a coherent political agenda and a compelling intellectual 
force.356 Thus, “for the first time [neo-conservatism] has become the 
central political axis, disappearing the traditional struggle between right 
and left on territorial questions of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.”357 
b. Moving the Rights Discourse to the Right 
The conservative project counters the liberal one, in former 
Minister Shaked’s words, by stopping national Zionism from 
“continu[ing] to bow down to the system of individual rights 
                                               
rather than shake them up. See Shaked, supra note 311; Chaim Navon, Age Out of 
Socialism, 77 DEOT (Dec. 2016–Jan. 2017), available at https://bit.ly/2I7zhil 
[Hebrew]. 
 354 The other area comprising the Palestinian Territories, the Gaza Strip, has 
arguably ceased being occupied territory with the “Disengagement Plan” of 2005 
(although still effectively controlled by Israel in many respects). See Roi Bachmutsky, 
Otherwise Occupied: The Legal Status of the Gaza Strip 50 Years after the Six-Day War, 57 
VA. J. INT’L L. 413 (2018); Benjamin Rubin, Disengagement from the Gaza Strip and Post-
Occupation Duties, 42 ISR. L. REV. 528 (2009). 
 355 See Orna Ben-Naftali, Michael Sfard & Hedi Viterbo, THE ABC OF THE 
OPT: A LEGAL LEXICON OF THE ISRAELI CONTROL OVER THE OCCUPIED 
PALESTINIAN TERRITORY, 6–17, 362–82, 399–416 and passim (2018); ARIELLA 
AZOULAY & ADI OPHIR, THE ONE-STATE CONDITION: OCCUPATION AND 
DEMOCRACY IN ISRAEL/PALESTINE 81 (Tal Haran trans., 2013). 
 356 Ben-Porat & Yuval, supra note 344, at 15. 
 357 Erez Tzfadia, The Triumph of Neo-Conservatism, HAOKETS (Jan. 30, 2013), 
https://bit.ly/2I63SwK [Hebrew]. For claims that stances toward national-territorial 
questions ultimately still determine positions on the political map, see Krampf, supra 
note 347; Ilan Saban, The Political Counter-Response to the “Constitutional Revolution,” 13 
PUB. SPACE [HAMERHAV HATZIBURI] 13 (2017) [Hebrew]; Kalman Neuman, Indeed 
‘Neo-Conservatism’?, 22 AKDAMOT 222 (2009), 
https://www.bmj.org.il/userfiles/akdamot/22/Noyman.pdf [Hebrew] (a response 
to Eidar, supra note 350). 
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interpreted in a universal way.”358 At the same time, Shaked 
congratulated her religious constituents for electing her, a secular 
woman, thus: “the fact that I was elected to my post in an open primary 
shows that ‘Jewish Home’ [her former party] voters are very open and 
very liberal.”359 Israeli conservatism walks a tightrope, navigating 
between staunch patriotism and the desire to reconfigure institutions, 
and between traditional collectivism and the valorization of individual 
merit. The utilization and manipulation of the language of rights in 
unconventional ways has proven very helpful in this endeavor, at times 
directly following American examples. 
One such site is relaxing the regulation of private firearm 
possession. In August 2018, the Minister of Public Security laxed the 
criteria for licenses to keep personal firearm, allowing hundreds of 
thousands to become eligible. The reasons given were the potential 
contribution to public safety, since these individuals would be able to 
ward off terrorist attacks, and also that firearm possession is an 
entitlement, necessary for exercising the right to self-protection.360 
                                               
 358 Levi, supra note 265. The biggest triumph of the Right in this regard is 
the latest Basic Law enacted in 2018, Basic Law: Israel as the Nation State of the 
Jewish People. For analysis of the law, see Suzie Navot & Yaniv Roznai, From Supra-
Constitutional Principles to the Misuse of Constituent Power in Israel, 21 EUR. J.L. REFORM 
403 (2019). The Basic Law was structured around themes antithetical to Barakian 
ones, and has been portrayed as the culmination of the backlash against Barak’s 
legacy. MAUTNER, LIBERALISM IN ISRAEL, supra note 8, at 118; Amit Segal, The Rise 
and Fall of the Nationality Law, MAKOR RISHON (July 14, 2018), 
https://www.makorrishon.co.il/opinion/62607/ [Hebrew]. But cf. Jabareen, supra 
note 12, at 449 (arguing that this law merely exposes hegemonic Zionism’s exclusion 
of Palestinian citizens from “We, the Jewish People,” which has always been 
accepted by liberal jurists as well); see also MAUTNER, LIBERALISM IN ISRAEL, supra, at 
174–78. 
 359 Tepperman, supra note 267, at 2. 
 360 See Ministry of Public Security, As of Today: Graduates of Recon Rifleman 07 
Training are Eligible for Firearm License (Aug. 20, 2018), 
https://www.gov.il/he/departments/news/firearm-license-criteria-expansion-2018 
[Hebrew]; Josh Breiner, Erdan Promotes: Hundreds of Thousands More Citizens to Become 
Eligible for Firearm Possession Licenses, HAARETZ (July 7, 2018), 
https://www.haaretz.co.il/news/politics/.premium-1.6246673 [Hebrew]. There is 
currently a petition pending at the Supreme Court against the new regulations. HCJ 
8451/18 The Gun on the Kitchen Table v. Minister of Public Security (last checked 
May 26, 2020). 
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Both aspects signify a privatization of the state’s authority and duty 
toward the citizenry, delegating responsibility to the individual. This 
expansion followed a surge in demand for freer gun use, framed in the 
language of natural rights, as there is no positive anchor in Israeli law 
for such a right.361 A growing number of libertarian MKs reiterated,362 
some of whom while parroting data provided by gun advocacy interest 
groups that draw on the American National Rifle Association.363 
Among these MKs is Amir Ohana, who succeeded Shaked as Minister 
of Justice (2019–2020). As the first openly gay minister in Israeli 
history,364 Ohana, like his predecessor,365 navigates an appreciation of 
the liberal rights discourse that allowed him to gain political power, 
with an overtly antagonistic approach to the justice system responsible 
for it, which he then headed. Described as “represent[ing] the death of 
the liberal Israeli Right,”366 Ohana, again like his predecessor, views 
this system “not as a moral force but as a competing interest group.”367 
                                               
 361 See Refael Minnes, Carrying Weapon for Self-Defense is a Basic Right, Not a 
Privilege, MIDA (March 8, 2018), https://bit.ly/2QDKpEt [Hebrew]; Rodena Golz, 
What about the Right to Carry Firearm?, MIDA (Oct. 14, 2013), https://bit.ly/2K8GrFb 
[Hebrew]. See also Aviram, supra note 8, at 38. 
 362 A case in point is MK Amir Ohana, who headed the Knesset’s firearm 
policy lobby and pushed for deregulation, and later became Minister of Justice (infra 
note 364–367 and accompanying text). Ohana combines libertarianism with extreme 
hawkish views, that deem any restraint on the military, such as judicial review, a threat 
to national security. The result is that natural rights are really powers allocated to 
Jews and withheld from Palestinians. Adam Hakim & Tom Ziv, An Interview with 
Amir Ohana: “We Shouldn’t be Shocked by the Idea of Disobeying the Supreme Court,” ZAVIT 
AHERET (May 31, 2018), http://www.zavitaheret.com/?p=6450 [Hebrew]. 
 363 See The Whistle, On the Use of Firearm in Domestic Homicides (Aug. 21, 2018), 
https://www.thewhistle.co.il/feed/owxvg9E0V6 [Hebrew] (a fact-check of MK 
Ohana, who relied on data provided by the Association for the Promotion of Gun 
Culture in Israel); Hod & Levi, supra note 340. 
 364 See Marcy Oster, Israel Has Its First Gay Government Minister – Netanyahu 
Loyalist Amir Ohana, TIMES OF ISRAEL (June 7, 2019), 
https://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-has-its-first-gay-government-minister-
netanyahu-loyalist-amir-ohana/. 
 365 Supra text accompanying note 359. 
 366 Matti Freidman, Amir Ohana Is Gay and Right-Wing. How Far Can He Go in 
Israel?, N.Y. TIMES (June 6, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/06/opinion/amir-ohana-israel-gay.html. 
 367 Id. 
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Other moves are at once pro-privatization, anti-universalism, 
and anti-elitism,368 as part of a traditionalist-libertarian convergence in 
religious Zionism circles, which resembles the American Protestant 
one.369 A particularly crude example is a prominent Rabbi’s invocation 
of J. S. Mill’s harm principle to oppose gay couples adopting children, 
claiming children’s freedom is infringed upon when they are deprived 
of mothers.370 A more sophisticated argument presented by another 
influential Rabbi is that religious Zionism should ‘age out’ of socialism 
and embrace free market mechanisms to remedy the “offensive 
monopoly of the state” over things like education and welfare.371 The 
Rabbi reasons that the Jewish tradition is one of national unity between 
decentralized communities, which encourages non-coerced solidarity: 
“thin bureaucracy leaves room for a healthy nation and a strong 
society.”372 
                                               
 368 Specifically, intellectual elitism. See RICHARD HOFSTADTER, ANTI-
INTELLECTUALISM IN AMERICAN LIFE (1963). On Prime Minister Netanyahu’s self-
portrayal as an anti-elitist, see FILC, supra note 347, at 73. 
 369 See Ravit Hecht, This is How the Right-Wing Converted the Anti-Liberal 
Discourse, HAARETZ (Aug. 2, 2018), available at 
https://www.haaretz.co.il/magazine/the-edge/.premium-1.6337418 [Hebrew]; 
Houminer, supra note 332; Ram, supra note 326, at 29. On the emergence of a 
protestant-like interpretive theology in Israel, see Amnon Raz-Krakotzkin, “There is 
no God, but He Promised Us the Land,” 3 MITAAM 71, 73 (2005), available at 
https://library.osu.edu/projects/hebrew-lexicon/99995-files/99995093/99995093-
03-files/99995093-03-071-076.pdf [Hebrew]; cf. supra note 214. 
 370 Shlomo Aviner, Babies for Perverts, KIPA (July 23, 2018), 
https://bit.ly/2WtzY9q [Hebrew]. 
 371 Navon, supra note 353. 
 372 Id. It is not clear, however, that economic neo-liberalism is truly the 
zeitgeist within religious Zionism. Compare GILAD BE’ERY, THE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN RELIGIOSITY AND THE PREFERRED ECONOMIC REGIME IN ISRAEL (2014) 
[Hebrew], available at https://www.idi.org.il/books/5166 (finding that overall, 
religious people in Israel lean more to socialism and secular people to capitalism), 
with Houminer, supra note 332 (arguing that the shift in the religious Zionist elite has 
been stark, and its gradual trickling down can be clearly detected). Some polls indicate 
that “Shaked’s dog-eat-dog worldview couldn’t be more out of whack with how 
much Israelis trust and support the idea of a welfare state.” Hod & Levi, supra note 
340. Yet the same authors also mention that “the religious right has stood at the 
forefront of resistance to every single social justice campaign in Israel—from the 
massive protests in the summer of 2011, to the struggle to raise the minimum wage.” 
Id. One explanation that has been offered is that this is a pragmatic strategy rather 
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Spiritual leaders reinterpret Judaism to create American-style 
social conservatism interwoven with various other conservative 
threads, thus offering a holistic world-view the Right has been 
craving.373 Furthermore, this endeavor leads to similar legal initiatives, 
such as creating a “right to work” that undermines labor unions,374 and 
allowing private businesses to refuse service to LGBT people, as a 
matter of religious liberty.375 The picture drawn in these 
reconceptualized culture wars clearly suffers from lack of originality. It 
depicts a zero-sum game between PC culture on one side, tradition, 
common sense, and freedom on the other side.376 It is also a rights 
discourse that works for the powerful and is not universal, as it 
embraces the principle of a natural hierarchy between people, and 
bows down to national might.377 At the bottom of both axes are 
Palestinians, the subjugation of whose interests to those of the Jewish 
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(July 2, 2018), https://www.maariv.co.il/news/politics/Article-648425 [Hebrew]. 
For a positioning of such cases within a broader framework of American 
conservatism, see Noa Ben-Asher, Faith-Based Emergency Powers, 41 HARV. J.L. & 
GENDER 269 (2018). 
 376 See, e.g., Schvarcz, infra note 330. 
 377 Hod & Houminer, supra note 373; Horowitz, supra note 373; Shaul Arieli, 
Look for the Override Clause in Rabbi Kook, HAARETZ (May 14, 2018), 
https://www.haaretz.co.il/opinions/.premium-1.6078594 [Hebrew]. 
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collective is justified from nationalist, religious, and economic 
perspectives.378  
c. Restraining the (Legal) Administrative State 
A crucial component of the American conservative reaction to 
legal liberalism is the effort to curtail the administrative state, after it 
gained new theoretical prominence thanks to the Legal Process 
school.379 A similar development in underway in Israel. Specifically, 
various politicians on the Right, including both ministers of justice 
discussed above, have embarked in recent years on a fierce campaign 
against the powers of government lawyers and legal advisors, who are 
career professionals holding non-partisan positions.380 Such efforts 
include, but are not limited to, altering appointment processes so that 
ministers would have personal control over them,381 and sanctioning 
government lawyers for voicing concern over liberal-democratic 
principles being jeopardized for populist reasons.382 
                                               
 378 A case in point is the political movement Zehut [Identity], which 
combines a libertarian platform focused on marijuana legalization with religiously-
informed, ultra-nationalist positions. https://zehut.org.il/zehut-platform/?lang=en 
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 379 Supra notes 49–51 and accompanying text. 
 380 See generally YOAV DOTAN, LAWYERING FOR THE RULE OF LAW: 
GOVERNMENT LAWYERS AND THE RISE OF JUDICIAL POWER IN ISRAEL (2014). 
 381 See Mordechai Kremnitzer, Eventually the Attorney General will Also Be a 
Political Appointee, HAARETZ (June 24, 2018), 
https://www.haaretz.co.il/opinions/.premium-1.6201465 [Hebrew]. 
 382 Moran Azulay, Tova Tzimuki & Shahar Hay, Shaked Demands Dismissal of 
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the state’s right to ‘freedom of funding.’ Id. 
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The desired model for government attorneys is the American 
‘Hired Gun’ one.383 This same model was advanced in a 2019 
concurrence by Shaked-appointed Justice Stein. Rejecting as 
“silencing” the Court’s established stance that the state should not 
defend in court an executive decision which the Attorney General 
thinks is illegal,384 Stein alludes to the promise of returning to an 
idealized pre-Barak jurisprudence: “these matters are best handled like 
they used to be in the more distant past.”385 Both the Barakian and the 
reactionist stances promote a unitary executive branch, but they 
diverge on who gets to articulate it—one approach has faith in the 
existence of objective legal categories and in the ability of legal 
professionals to identify them; the other prefers instead to have legal 
decisions made by the same persons who decide on substantive policy. 
The latter approach has been particularly appealing to 
American conservatives due to its majoritarian and traditionalist 
character: “The unitary executive may be linked to majoritarianism 
through the Framers’ concern for centralizing public accountability in 
the President.”386 Legal and bureaucratic checks on executive power 
are now framed in Israel, as they are in the U.S., in conspiratorial 
rhetoric, as emanating from the “deep state.”387 While arguments both 
for and against the ‘Hired Gun’ model in the U.S. are made by 
reference to the executive’s democratic accountability,388 the executive 
is not an elected branch in Israel, yet holds massive sway over the 
legislature. This trend can thus be understood in the framework of 
                                               
 383 Michael Asimov & Yoav Dotan, Hired Guns and Ministers of Justice: The Role 
of Government Attorneys in the United States and Israel, 49 ISR. L. REV. 3 (2016). 
 384 Note that in Israel, Minister of Justice and Attorney General are separate 
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democratic backsliding.389 Yet it is no coincidence that it resonates 
especially with religious Zionism circles,390 since its rationalization also 
connotes multiple tenets of the American conservatism narrative. 
Shaked’s top legal aide has provided, also in Hashiloach, the rationale 
that government attorneys are wrong to follow an independent 
professional ethos because their job is to serve the relevant political 
figure as their private client.391 Viewed under this light, it becomes 
clearer why Justice Stein found it apt to apply Justice Holmes’s quote 
that “the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself 
accepted in the competition of the market,”392 to powerful politicians 
with unlimited media access who make putatively illegal decisions. 
Thus, the anti-administrative state strand is merged with substantive 
conservative inclinations. Such moves may register as a series of shifts 
from rule of law to rule of men, yet their advocates rather ask whose will 
ought to rule: whether the policymaker’s or the jurist’s. Justice 
Sohlberg wishes the judge to cease being an antagonist to governability 
and instead become its ally.393 
It is not new to portray elitist legalism as an impediment to 
national security. The accusation that lawyers tie soldiers’ hands behind 
their backs in times of war is well-known, yet continuously reiterated.394 
Israel has been in a legal state of emergency ever since its 
establishment,395 and executive actions of all kinds are rationalized by 
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linkage to the war effort.396 What is new is that now the operation of 
the government itself is also a matter of market efficiency.397 Executive 
control over legal and administrative professionals—and most of all 
those who belong to both categories—is thus necessary. First, for 
defending inside cohesion against outside enemies. Second, for 
reducing invisible hand frictions. Third, because curtailing government 
jurists helps to justify the curtailment of judicial ones, as judicial 
deference to the executive branch is justified by the latter having 
democratic legitimacy to carry out chosen policy.398 
4. Between Law and Politics: Judicial Outcomes 
Political questions often transform into adjudicative ones, and 
vice versa.399 The dialectic between these two public spheres varies 
across time and place and takes different shapes within different 
cultural frameworks. In Israel, scholars have portrayed a narrative 
according to which an important political function fulfilled by the 
Barak Court, PI included, has been the preservation of power in the 
hands of a particular social group, in the face of multiculturalism. 
According to Menachem Mautner, Ran Hirschl, and others, a secular-
liberal former hegemony took to the Court in response to the right-
wing political ascendance since the late 1970s,400 turning the judiciary 
into a vehicle of liberal policy-making in spite of popular will, a weapon 
in the culture wars.401 In religious and nationalist groups especially, 
                                               
 396 See Netanyahu, supra note 314. 
 397 Former mayor of Jerusalem, MK Nir Barkat, has made this proposition 
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Barak’s Constitutional Revolution is understood as a usurpation of the 
constitutional framework for the benefit of one side on the political 
map, inadvertently consolidating those communities that oppose the 
liberal project.402 Notwithstanding other intra-Israeli as well as global 
processes that may add important explanations for this turn in Israeli 
jurisprudence,403 it is generally accepted that the Court has since 
become a stronghold of political liberalism, implemented by means of 
interpretation and construction doctrines.404 One of the problems this 
entails is that the gap between the judiciary and the public is constantly 
broadening, while in politics, the liberal camp has been unable to 
present a compelling agenda that would return it to power.405 Under 
this light, the rise of PO is anything but surprising. 
The Barak Court hindered the rise of an intellectual 
conservative movement, but it could not do so forever and much less 
once Barak himself retired and the intellectual stature of the Court 
subsided. The conservative attack, starting with former incarnations of 
groups described above, is one of the factors Mautner mentions to 
explain the Court’s crisis of legitimacy in the late twentieth century. 
Their proposed reforms of the judiciary were among those 
implemented by former Ministers of Justice whose footsteps Ministers 
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Shaked and Ohana followed.406 But never before have political, civil 
and intellectual forces effectively coalesced to provide solid backup for 
such efforts. The nexus between these conditions and PO is fourfold: 
the new theory is legitimized by these circumstances; it reflects them; 
it shares their values; and it may thrive thanks to them. 
In the United States around the 1980s, not only did a 
comprehensive conservative political force form and not only was it 
joined by a judicial one, but also—this cooperation was successful. 
Conservative jurisprudence made conservative politicians happy.407 
PO’s deliverance should similarly be measured in terms of political 
outcomes on top of judicial methodology. We have already seen how 
in Israel too, a conservative judiciary can yield conservative results, or 
gratifying dissents and concurrences.408 But the role of interpretive 
methodology in most of these cases was not significant. The new 
theory has only been implemented in a handful of decisions, only one 
of which leading to an authoritative result that itself awaits 
reevaluation.409 In these cases, PO exemplifies the inner dilemmas of 
Israeli-American conservatism more than their resolutions: between 
religious interests and those of the free market; localization and 
majoritarianism; public virtue and personal responsibility. 
PO is as yet on the margins and hence it is difficult to assess 
its long-term effects. Note, however, that in both Gini and Rom, two 
different Presidents of the Court found it paramount to subject the 
legal reasoning presented to heightened judicial scrutiny, by ordering 
“further hearing” procedures.410 The disruptive potential of PO within 
the Court is thus well recognized, as it should be. Looking forward, 
PO is compatible with Israeli conservative politics in at least four 
important ways, which defy the trajectory of PI. 
First, the focus on law and religion issues positions PO against 
both judicial activism and social progressivism at the same time, since 
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the Supreme Court has been particularly active with respect to ‘the 
status quo.’411 
Second, PO’s originalist element allows a containment of 
rights, a difficult task to achieve with any evolutionary theory. Vaguely 
worded bills of rights inevitably get broadened over time but rarely 
narrowed down, unless past settlements have conclusive normative 
force.412 Sohlberg has doubted the centrality of rights to Israeli 
jurisprudence when he called for the enactment of a ‘Basic Law: 
Human Responsibility.’ Responsibility is a concept utilized by 
American conservatism, but which also has particular Jewish 
resonance.413 Such a Basic Law would, in Justice Sohlberg’s opinion, 
reintroduce the values that governed the Israeli public sphere before 
the rights discourse took over, cherishing social justice, fraternity, and 
“restoration of original splendor.”414 This seems to orient toward a 
civic republican rather than atomistic social vision, centered around a 
conception of the common good, which was indeed prevalent at 
Israel’s founding.415 
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Third, a rhetoric of clear cuts and decisiveness is abundant in 
political conservatism with respect to issues like the Occupation416 or 
separation of powers.417 PO joins this trend,418 adding to it the 
decisionism of originalism. Status quo and victory are both acceptable 
options—compromise not so much.419 Compromise is, however, what 
PI enshrines to facilitate its methodic and substantive liberalism. 
Barak’s judicial rhetoric frequently portrays his way as the middle 
ground between two extremes, and coupled with the inclusiveness of 
his method,420 it creates “a position that never needs to explicitly 
determine questions of ideology [ . . . ] ‘balance of interest’ becomes 
almost synonymous with ‘adjudication.’”421 
Fourth, legislative history provides judges with an avenue for 
instilling non-liberal interpretive principles with authority.422 
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Interpreting a given provision of Israeli law so as to bring to fruition 
the values of the entire legal system, as PI requires, would give 
precedence to liberal values, since they are embedded in the common 
law system inherited from the British rule. On the other hand, the 
values of the legislature in a given point in time, may have a more 
religious or nationalistic flavor. The legislative as well as the executive 
branches are concerned with promoting a national project and with 
pursuing short-sighted political gains, whereas an essential role of the 
judiciary, at least at common law and definitely in Israel ever since its 
founding, is to safeguard individual rights and project liberal values 
unto society.423 
This pivotal historical moment in Israeli jurisprudence has 
produced an avenue for the Court to address a shift in public discourse 
and public attitudes toward it, fill the vacuum in non-liberal 
jurisprudence, and possibly regain some of the public trust it has lost. 
But not without considerable costs, for the Israeli public and for the 
Court itself. An unfortunate result of the American interpretive dispute 
is an entrenchment of two opposing judicial camps, which correlate 
those on the political map. This is a corollary of the demand for 
methodological purism, and calls for non-absolutist approaches are 
growing in the U.S.424 PI attempts to provide that, employing various 
interpretive mechanisms in ostensible harmony, while PO builds on 
divisions. Coupled with the growing political tendency to divide judges 
into two camps, the Israeli Court may consequently become more 
polarized and politically tainted. If Justice Sohlberg stays true to the 
values represented by PO and remains consistent—for a pick and 
choose approach would encounter the same pitfalls from which he 
wants to salvage the Court—then judicial integrity may be enhanced, 
but judicial independence weakened. 
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I doubt that the future holds such polarization for the Israeli 
Supreme Court. The trajectory of the interpretation-ideology nexus in 
Israel hinges on two related questions: what traction PO and similar 
views will gain, and how the liberal wing will respond. One possible 
liberal strategy would be to develop—rather than reiterate—PI, 
perhaps by breaking the U.S.-inspired cycle and appealing to the local. 
A fruitful avenue might be to reclaim the evolving tradition of Jewish 
Law,425 another would be to develop a more inclusive localized 
philosophy.426 A different strategy would be to view PO as already the 
Court’s way to adapt to changes in the political climate. Due to factors 
like the relatively uniform ethos of the judiciary and the judges’ powers 
in the appointment process,427 the interpretive dispute might lead to a 
stronger judiciary. For the mere existence of a conservative minority 
that is intrinsic to the Court, can provide it with a veneer of pluralism. 
It would allow the Court to mitigate public criticism by occasionally 
extending a pound of flesh, in the form of a conservative victory, while 
retaining an overall liberal approach. 
IV.    CONCLUSION 
Contrary to recent scholarship on non-American 
originalism,428 this Article has told the story of a new originalist method 
that follows the same patterns of the American original, playing a role 
in a bigger conservative political project. I have argued that the current 
historical moment in Israeli jurisprudence marks a recreation of the 
dynamics that permeate the American discourse ever since the 1980s, 
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with a conservative backlash to a legal liberalism hegemony. In both 
countries, a judicial faith in liberal democracy produced progressive 
social outcomes via a teleological interpretive method. Subsequently, a 
massive political project rendered liberalism synonymous with left-
wing and conservatism synonymous with right-wing. This occurs when 
social traditionalism, neo-liberal economic policy, and hawkish 
national security stances join hands with judicial interpretive methods 
centered around originalism, formalism, and deference. This 
framework thus offers an alternative explanation—more theoretically 
coherent though perhaps no less troubling—to local manifestations of 
populism and democratic decline. Despite significant constitutional 
and cultural variations, American conservatism can be, and is in fact, 
reproduced in other countries as well. 
